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Preface
This thesis contains three papers on subjects falling within the broad field of Interna-
tional Macroeconomics. Here we provide a brief summary of each paper.
The first paper investigates the international distribution of external balances in a world
economy model. Quantitative analysis of the model indicates both macroeconomic un-
certainty and financial frictions have a substantial effect on the international dispersion
of external balances.
The second paper uses a world economy framework to investigate how real exchange
rate movements influence the international distribution of external balances. Approxi-
mations of the model provide preliminary evidence in favour of there being a meaningful
link between real exchange rate movements and the international diversity of external
balances.
The third paper investigates the link between exchange rate flexibility, the international
balance sheet and economic recoveries by analysing a dataset covering 201 recovery
episodes occurring between 1971 and 2007. The key finding is that when the external
foreign currency denominated debt of a country is relatively large, growth of GDP during
the recovery from a recession is faster under a pegged exchange rate regime than it is
under a more flexible arrangement.
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of Macroeconomic Uncertainty in
Global Equilibrium
We investigate the international distribution of external balances using a
world economy model featuring country-specific macroeconomic uncertainty.
Incomplete international financial markets and a collateral constraint on bor-
rowing both serve to limit risk-sharing opportunities. In this environment,
insurance against uncertainty takes the form of physical capital accumulation
and intertemporal trade between countries. The cross-country dispersion of
net foreign assets is close to its empirical counterpart. Macroeconomic un-
certainty accounts for about one third of the international variation of cross-
border asset holdings in the model. Approximations suggest that decreases in
financial frictions were an important driver of increases in the international
dispersion of external balances observed in the data.
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The considerable cross-country heterogeneity of external balances has become a defining
feature of the global financial landscape. At the end of 2006, after around 30 years
of growing cross-border financial integration, the range between the 10th and 90th per-
centiles of the international distribution of net foreign assets as a proportion of GDP was
approximately 100 percentage points. The standard deviation of the same distribution
was about 56 percent.1 Concerns regarding the sustainability of these imbalances and
the consequences of a significant international redistribution of capital from its present
state have motivated an on-going debate.
Efforts to improve awareness of factors driving the distribution of external balances
have figured prominently in these discussions. To this end, we examine the link between
macroeconomic uncertainty and international capital flows. We quantitatively analyse
a model world economy in which the precautionary saving response to country-specific
macroeconomic volatility plays a central role in the motivation of cross-border flows.
The pattern of net foreign asset holdings in this framework is broadly consistent with
the facts presented above. At the same time, the model is also relevant to earlier peri-
ods. In 1986, when financial globalisation was just gathering pace in emerging markets,
the aforementioned real-world measures of dispersion were about 20 percent lower. Our
model captures this evolution: When financial frictions are increased to reflect the lower
degree of financial openness in 1986, the increase in the model-generated cross-country
concentration of net foreign asset positions is comparable to the data. So, the framework
throws some light on the influence of financial liberalisation in the presence of macroe-
conomic uncertainty. In sum, the world economy model helps us gain a credible handle
on the contribution of macroeconomic uncertainty to the international dispersion of net
foreign asset holdings.
But why should macroeconomic uncertainty make a difference to intertemporal trade
1Our panel data covers 97 countries (21 developed and 76 developing/emerging market). All external
balance variables are demeaned by year. To smooth out short run fluctuations, (demeaned) net foreign
assets to GDP is averaged over a rolling 10-year window. To be clear, under this approach the averaged
value of net foreign assets to GDP for 2006 is the average over the period 2001 to 2010. Both net foreign
assets and GDP are PPP adjusted. See the Appendix in Section 1.5 for a detailed description of the
data.
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among nations? Recent work by Fogli and Perri (2015) and Hoffman, Krause and
Tillman (2014) offers empirical and theoretical evidence in favour of a link between
external balances and country-specific macroeconomic uncertainty for OECD and de-
veloping/emerging market nations. Uncertainty takes the form of perturbations to the
volatility of disturbances buffeting an economy. Their framework suggests that in the
absence of complete international risk-sharing markets, a country facing heightened rela-
tive macroeconomic volatility – represented by increased variability of country level GDP
growth net of global shocks – will increase saving relative to the rest of the world as a
means of ensuring a smooth consumption path. Part of this precautionary saving finds
its way overseas, thus connecting uncertainty with cross-border capital flows; countries
or regions confronting high levels of relative volatility become lenders to those enjoying
relatively calm conditions. Going further, this mechanism also indicates how uncertainty
can be associated with the cross-country dispersion of external balances. That is, time-
varying volatility widens the spread of potential shocks that an economy can experience,
thereby giving rise to a more diffuse range of possible external balances. To the extent
that all countries are exposed to this uncertainty, the presence of idiosyncratic volatility
shocks will affect the international variability of external balances.
For this hypothesised link between uncertainty and the dispersion of external balances
to be economically meaningful, the magnitude of idiosyncratic macroeconomic volatility
in the data needs to display substantial variation across countries in a typical year. In
Table 1.1: Relative Volatility
Interquantile Range
St. Dev. 95v5 90v10 75v25
All Countries 3.2 10.0 7.3 3.9
Developed 1.3 4.3 2.7 1.2
Developing/EM 3.3 10.8 7.6 3.9
The data covers 97 countries (21 developed and 76 develop-
ing/emerging market) and the period 1986-2010. All variables
measured in percent. St. Dev. equals the mean annual cross-
country standard deviation of relative volatility. Interquantile
Range equals the mean annual range between the specified
percentiles.
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other words, it must be common for some countries to be experiencing a relative mod-
eration in volatility while other nations are suffering through relatively unstable times.
The statistics displayed in Table 1.1, based on the sample period 1986 through 2011,
show that observed conditions meet this requirement: both measures indicate ample
international heterogeneity of relative volatility.2 In the average year, we find the stan-
dard deviation of relative volatility across all countries to be a quantitatively important
3.2 percent; likewise, the median distance between the 90th and 10th percentiles of the
annual international distribution is a sizeable 10 percentage points.3 Interestingly, there
is a marked difference between the degree of cross-country heterogeneity in developed
and developing/emerging market countries.
Since neither Fogli and Perri (2015) nor Hoffman et al (2014) examine both OECD and
developing/emerging nations, they do not assess how much of the global dispersion of
external balances can be accounted for by country-specific uncertainty. Our goal here is
to put forward an answer to this question. To be clear, this paper and the two previously
cited studies both sidestep the many other potential drivers of global imbalances, some of
which are discussed in the literature review below. Fundamentally, this approach seeks
to understand the role of macroeconomic uncertainty in isolation, to gauge its influence
on capital flows.
2We follow Fogli and Perri (2015) by measuring idiosyncratic macroeconomic volatility in a given
country as the standard deviation of country-level GDP growth less the average standard deviation of
GDP growth for all other countries. Specifically, we measure the standard deviation of GDP growth







where gi,t is the (log) growth of GDP for country i in year t and g¯i,t0 is the average GDP growth for
country i over the 10-year window around t0. Then, idiosyncratic macroeconomic volatility, which we
will also refer to as relative volatility or macroeconomic uncertainty, for country i at time t0 equals,






where N equals the number of countries.
3The statistics presented in Table 1.1 are virtually identical if we use the median year instead of the
mean.
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The foundation of our analysis is an artificial world economy comprised of numerous ex
ante identical small open economies, each producing a homogeneous tradable good using
labour and physical capital. Countries lend and borrow from one another using a risk-
free (non-state contingent) bond. Foreign borrowing is limited by a collateral constraint.
Given these limits on risk sharing, country-specific stochastic (transitory) productivity
shocks bring about precautionary saving and in turn, ex post heterogeneity amongst na-
tions. Put another way, countries employ capital accumulation and international trade
in the risk-free bond as means of smoothing consumption in the face of idiosyncratic
productivity shocks. Due to the international diversity in shock histories, these risk-
sharing activities give rise to cross-country variation in cumulative asset positions (both
foreign and domestic). By augmenting this framework to include a time-varying element
in the volatility of productivity shocks, we elucidate the link between macroeconomic
uncertainty and the international dispersion of foreign asset holdings. Moreover, through
randomly allocating countries to one of two developmental groups (developed and devel-
oping/emerging market) we allow our key driver of precautionary saving to incorporate
the sharp distinction between macroeconomic uncertainty in developed and developing
nations, as observed in Table 1.1.
We calibrate the parameters of the model to match salient characteristics of a large panel
of 97 countries (21 developed and 76 developing/emerging markets) over the 30 years
through 2010. Our focus is directed at the quantitative implications of the model, with
particular emphasis on the long-run global distribution of external balances. Aside from
exhibiting reasonable business cycle dynamics, the baseline model for 2006 displays a
long-run equilibrium in which the relatively high volatility developing/emerging market
region is a net lender to the developed region where volatility is low by comparison.
Measures of cross-country net foreign asset to GDP dispersion in the model featuring
time-varying volatility are about 90 percent that in the data for 2006.4 The model
performs less well on the trade balance and current account. When we turn our attention
4When discussing the results from our analysis the term net foreign assets will be used to refer to the
net foreign asset to GDP ratio. Likewise for the trade balance and current account.
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to 1986 and tighten financial frictions to obtain gross world debt levels observable at
that time, the international dispersion of net foreign assets is around 80 percent as
diffuse as the data. The effect of macroeconomic uncertainty is significant: in each of
our approximations, time-varying volatility consistently accounts for about one third of
model-generated dispersion.
Related Literature – This paper is most closely related to the literature examining
the relationship between macroeconomic uncertainty and external balances, prominent
examples of which include the papers by Fogli and Perri (2015) and Hoffman, Krause
and Tillman (2014) discussed above. A complementary paper by Fogli and Perri (2006)
contends that by lowering macroeconomic volatility in the US relative to the rest of
the world, the Great Moderation played a non-trivial role in the rise of the US cur-
rent account deficit over the 25 years through 2006. Additional insight consistent with
these findings is provided by Gourio, Siemer and Verdelhen (2015) who present empir-
ical evidence that emerging market countries confronted with heightened volatility – in
the form of a rise in the country-specific component of a nation’s stock market return
volatility – tend to exhibit both decreased capital inflows and increased capital outflows.
These papers considered levels of economic development one at a time. Accordingly, my
paper contributes to this strand of the literature by employing a framework in which
developed and developing/emerging market countries both coexist and interact with one
another.
Echoing our own approach, a number of existing papers also employ stochastic world
economy models featuring a continuum of countries and incomplete international insur-
ance markets.5 Starting with the investigation into the impact of international differences
in rates of taxation and time preference on external balances by Clarida (1990), these
papers have covered a variety of issues including the relationship between cross-country
5Fundamentally, this approach to modelling global equilibrium is a variant of the benchmark Bewley-
Aiyagari-Huggett setup, with the heterogeneous households in those earlier models viewed instead as
heterogeneous countries. See the survey articles by Guvenen (2012) and Heathcote, Storesletten and Vi-
olante (2009) for a comprehensive review of the literature on macroeconomic models with heterogeneous
households.
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technological differences and physical capital accumulation (Castro (2005)), the impact
of trade openness on economic development (Castro (2006)), the Feldstein-Horioka puz-
zle (Bai and Zhang (2010)), imperfect international risk sharing (Bai and Zhang (2012)),
and international debt deleveraging (Fornaro (2014)). Of greatest relevance for our pur-
poses is the work of Chang, Kim and Lee (2013) which uses a multi-country model
of global equilibrium under incomplete markets to show that the precautionary saving
response to country-specific productivity shocks is able to match the international dis-
persion of net foreign assets in the data but is unable to explain the diversity of current
account or trade balance positions. Also of relevance is Sandri (2009), which relies on a
world economy framework with countries separated into six regions, each with a different
endowment volatility, to illustrate how the combination of such regional heterogeneity
and the precautionary saving motive can generate cross-country imbalances in current
account and net foreign asset positions. The models used by Chang et al. and Sandri
both impose a fixed borrowing limit on all countries, while at the same time employing a
shock process with constant volatility. In contrast, by disciplining national leverage with
a collateral constraint our model incorporates the more conservative notion that debt is
limited by asset holdings, in turn bringing borrowing decisions more in line with typical
real-world practice. Moreover, the inclusion of data-consistent time-varying volatility
shocks also differentiates our framework.
The previously mentioned literature on external balances is also part of the broader
field of research attempting to explain the global imbalances that have emerged since
the 1980s. On the theory side, the distribution of capital flows has been put down
to a number of factors including (but not limited to): international heterogeneity in
the supply of financial assets (Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2008)); cross-country
differences in the availability of risk sharing opportunities (Mendoza, Quadrini and Rios-
Rull (2009)); changes in the valuation of external assets and liabilities (Devereux and
Sutherland (2010)); the motivation to insure against the risk of a sudden stop (Durdu,
Mendoza and Terrones (2009)); and export-led growth policies (Dooley, Folkerts-Landau
and Garber (2003)). On the empirical side, the imbalances and the capital flows that un-
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derlie them have been characterised by, amongst others, Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013);
Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan and Volosovych (2014); and Obstfeld, Taylor and Shambaugh
(2010). See Gourinchas and Rey (2015) for more detail on the literature concerning
global imbalances.
The main body of this paper covers the delineation of our world economy model (sec-
tion 1) and the investigation of its quantitative properties (section 2). Section 3 con-
cludes.
1.1 World Economy Model
The world economy consists of a continuum of small open economies (countries) subject
to idiosyncratic productivity shocks. There is no aggregate (world-level) uncertainty in
the model. The basic structure of each country resembles the standard discrete time,
single good, single asset framework typified by Mendoza (1991), though here the small
open economy is framed in terms of an infinitely lived representative firm-household as in
Mendoza (2010). This firm-household is tasked with both consumption and production
decisions. Limited risk-sharing opportunities at the international level provide an impe-
tus for precautionary saving. The configuration of the small open economy makes three
key departures from the canonical setup. Firstly, the volatility of the exogenous produc-
tivity process is perturbed by time-varying shocks. Secondly, borrowing is collateralized
by the firm’s holdings of physical capital. Finally, interest on the internationally traded
risk-free bond incorporates a spread reflecting the cost of financial intermediation, as in
Chang et al. (2013).
1.1.1 The Firm-Household
Let ct represent household consumption of the single tradable good and lt be the agent’s







E0 is the expectations operator conditional on information available at time zero and β is
the discount factor. The period utility function takes the form introduced by Greenwood,









where γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion and 1/(ω − 1) is the Frisch elasticity
of labour supply. This preference specification implies that household labour supply is
independent of consumption.




t , produces the single good using labour (lt) and
physical capital (kt). Physical capital depreciates at rate δ and changes to the capital
stock incur an adjustment cost which is a function of net investment, θ2(kt+1−kt)
2.
Drawing on Fogli and Perri (2015), total factor productivity (xt) adheres to the following
autoregressive process:
log(xt) = ρxlog(xt−1) + e
vtǫxt (1.1)
where ǫxt represents a stochastic i.i.d perturbation to TFP with mean zero and vari-
ance σ2x. Persistence of x is given by ρx. Disturbances to the variability of TFP (vt)
follow,
vt = ρvlog(vt−1) + ǫ
v
t (1.2)
where ǫvt is a stochastic i.i.d shock to the volatility of TFP with mean zero and variance




t are assumed to be independent of one
another.
Financial markets are assumed to be complete within countries and incomplete at the
international level. The agent can lend and borrow using an internationally traded one
period non-state-contingent bond (bt) denominated in units of the single good. The
firm-household’s bond position is a proxy for net foreign asset holdings, and when bt < 0
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the agent is a net debtor. Interest on the bond, Rt, combines the market clearing interest
rate (r) and a fixed spread (φ) reflecting financial intermediation costs,
Rt =
{
rl = r − φ for bt+1 ≥ 0
rb = r + φ otherwise
Chang et al. (2013) found the inclusion of this type of interest rate spread made the shape
of the model generated cross-sectional distribution of net foreign assets more realistic
relative to results obtained with no spread.













Borrowing is restricted to proportion η of physical capital holdings,6
bt+1 ≥ −ηkt+1
This endogenous borrowing constraint is a simple and tractable means of encapsulating
the notion that availability of credit is limited by a country’s wealth. Although we do
not provide a derivation here, this type of constraint can be shown to emerge when
borrowers have limited commitment to repay debt.
1.1.2 Global Equilibrium
Stated recursively, the decision problem facing the firm-household is,























rl = r − φ for b
′ ≥ 0
rb = r + φ otherwise
The usual convention of no subscript and prime superscript signify current and next
period timing of state and control variables. The state space for each country comprises
the endogenously determined bond holdings (b) and physical capital stock (k) of the firm-
household, along with the exogenous vector of disturbances to TFP and the volatility of
TFP, z ≡ (x, v). The sets containing all possible realisations of b, k and z are denoted
B, K and Z respectively. The firm-household’s optimality conditions are detailed in the
Appendix in Section 1.6.
Our chief concern is the stationary recursive competitive equilibrium of the global econ-
omy, which is defined as,
- the set of policy rules for consumption, c(b, k, z), labour supply, l(b, k, z), physical
capital, k′(b, k, z), and bond holdings, b′(b, k, z);
- a value function: V (b, k, z)
- a world interest rate R
- a probability distribution, m(b, k, z), of countries over possible states
such that,
- the policy rules and value function solve the individual country problem given R,
- the probability distribution is stationary and consistent with the optimal policy
rules and shock process;
- the world bond market clears:
∫
B×K×Z
b′(b, k, z)dm = 0
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1.1.3 Calibration
The parameters used in our benchmark model are summarised in Table 1.2. In our
quantitative experiments, one time period equals a year. The benchmark year is 2006.
Following standard practice for the modelling of small open economy models, we set the
capital intensity (α) equal to 0.36 and the annual rate of depreciation on capital (δ)
equal to 10 percent. The discount factor (β) is adjusted (according to the algorithm
described in Section 1.1.4) until the market clearing interest rate in the stochastic sta-
tionary state (r) equals 4 percent per annum, a typical value for multi-country models
featuring incomplete markets. All approximated solutions satisfy the standard theoret-
ical requirement that β(1 + r) < 1 in order for the long-run global bond distribution to
be stationary.
Table 1.2: Benchmark Parameters
Value Source/Target
Capital Intensity α = 0.36 Standard Value
Depreciation Rate δ = 0.1 Standard Value
Discount Factor β = 0.9612 R = 4%
Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion γ = 4 see text
Capital Adjustment Cost θ = 0.017 σi/σy ≈ 3
Frisch Elasticity of Labour Supply 1/(ω − 1) = 2.2 Mendoza (1991)
Maximum Leverage η = 0.47 World Debt/World GDP = 18%
Interest Rate Spread φ = 0.1% Chang et al. (2013)
TFP Shock - Developing/EM σ1,x=0.0258, ρ1,x = 0.4 Mendoza (1991) and Uribe (2013)
Developed σ2,x = .0129, ρ2,x = 0.4 Mendoza (1991)
Volatility Shock - Developing/EM σ1,v=0.633, ρ1,v = 0.8 see text
Developed σ2,v=0.46, ρ2,v = 0.8 see text
The elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) is a particularly important parameter
due to the centrality of precautionary saving in our quantitative analysis. However,
there is no obvious candidate value given the controversy surrounding the estimation
of the EIS in the empirical literature. In their meta-analysis of 169 published papers
covering 104 nations Havranek, Horvath, Irsova and Rusnak (2015) highlight substantial
heterogeneity in estimates of the EIS both within and between countries; accordingly,
choosing the appropriate EIS is doubly precarious in the context of our global model.
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For that reason, we combine a benchmark specification in which the EIS (1/γ) equals
0.25, a level between the extremes observed in the empirical and theoretical literature,
with sensitivity analysis using more extreme values.
The capital adjustment cost parameter (θ) is used to obtain a ratio of investment volatil-
ity to output volatility (σi/σy) of approximately 3 in the stochastic stationary equilib-
rium, in line with the data. Given the absence of labour market frictions in the model
and our need to generate the countercyclical trade balance observed in the data, it is
necessary for us to set the Frisch elasticity of labour supply near the upper end of empir-
ical estimates. Following Mendoza (1991), a value of 2.2 is chosen for this labour supply
elasticity, 1/(ω − 1).7
To determine the maximum permissible leverage ratio (debt as a proportion of physical
capital stock) for the firm-household (η) we adapt the approach of Fornaro (2014) to
our collateral constraint. Specifically, η is chosen so that the ratio of gross world debt
to world GDP in the stochastic stationary equilibrium equals 18 percent, the average
value of the corresponding ratio over the rolling 10-year window for 2006 in our panel
dataset.
We assume the spread between lending and borrowing rates (φ) is 0.1 percent per an-
num in our baseline specification. Since this spread lies at the lower bound of empirical
estimates in Chang et al. (2013), it is the least conservative choice for our model. Conse-
quently, we consider the impact of widening the spread in our sensitivity analysis.
Heterogeneity – The source of cross-country heterogeneity in the model is the exoge-
nous TFP process, given by (1.1) and (1.2). Realisations of this process depend on the
outcome of several events. The parameters defining the variability of TFP are contingent
upon the country’s level of economic development and as a result, the first event involves
the country entering a draw to determine its allocation between two broad categories:
developed and developing/emerging market. Subsequently, the country draws realisa-
7Relatively high values for the Frisch elasticity are frequently found in the RBC literature, with the
indivisible labour model of Hansen (1985) being a seminal example.
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tions of the productivity shock and the disturbance to the volatility of productivity. In
addition to the contribution made by these lotteries, the ultimate level of productivity
also depends on prior realisations of the productivity process.
In our quantitative investigation, each of the events constituting the productivity pro-
cess are approximated with a two-state Markov processes designed to capture relevant
features of panel data on GDP from the Penn World Tables. This specification implies
there are 8 possible exogenous states in the model.
Elements of the transition probability matrix for assignment to country category are
chosen to meet two criteria: (i) the annual probability of switching from develop-
ing/emerging market status to developed must match a rough estimate of the prob-
ability of a non-OECD country gaining accession to the OECD in a given year;8 (ii) the
proportion of world GDP produced by developed countries in the stochastic stationary
equilibrium must equal 54 percent, as in our data for the benchmark year (2006).
The parameters of the TFP shock for country group j (σj,x and ρj,x) are set in line with
values employed in the literature on small open economy models. Following Mendoza
(1991), the standard deviation and persistence of the TFP shock for the developed
country group equal 1.29 percent and 0.4 respectively. The analysis of business cycle
characteristics in a panel of 120 countries by Uribe (2013) indicates that the standard
deviation of GDP in poor and emerging market countries is about twice as large as that
8We use OECD membership as a proxy for developed country status. In 1960, the OECD was
established and it had 20 members at that time. Our estimate begins with an approximation of the
typical number of countries outside the original 20 members for the years since the OECD’s inception.
We view 150 countries as a reasonable choice here. This implies there have been 8,250 country-year
observations for which we can record the membership status for these non-OECD nations. Another
15 countries joined the OECD over the 55 years through 2015. We remove the post-accession years
for these new members from our previous tally and are left with 7,881 observations. Therefore, 15
accessions to membership occurred during the 7,881 country-year observations, which can plausibly be
viewed as implying that the probability of gaining membership in a particular year was about 0.002.
This value is used as our rough estimate for the probability of switching from developing/emerging
market to developed in the transition matrix. To the best of my knowledge, a more precise measure of
this probability is not currently available in the literature. Using a more finely divided scale of country
income groupings than our own, Kremer, Onatski and Stock (2001) estimated a transition probability
matrix for country movement between income groupings using data for 140 countries over the period 1960
through 1996. Although not directly comparable to our transition probabilities due to its reliance on a
different approach to grouping countries, their analysis does not make our estimate seem unreasonable.
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in developed countries. On the basis of this finding, the standard deviation of the TFP
shock for the developing/emerging market group equals 2.58 percent. The persistence
of the TFP shock in developing/emerging market countries is 0.4.
In the data, the cross-country dispersion of the relative volatility of GDP growth does
not exhibit a clear and consequential tendency toward increase or decrease over the
course of the sample period for either country group. To capture this observation,
the standard deviation of the disturbance to the volatility of TFP for country group
j (σj,v) in our baseline approximation is selected to ensure the dispersion of relative
volatility for country group j in a simulation of the model matches the mean of the
annual cross-country standard deviations of relative volatility for country group j in the
data. Persistence of relative volatility in the data does not differ substantially between
country groups. In light of this, we set the persistence of the volatility shock (ρv) equal
to the average first-order autocorrelation of relative volatility for the whole panel.
The two possible realisations of the TFP shock and the shock to the volatility of TFP for
country group j in our approximations are ±σj,x and ±σj,v respectively. The long-run
(unconditional) probability of each realization (Π) is assumed to be 0.5 for both Markov
chains. Using an approach intended to deliver the required level of persistence in the
Markov process, the elements of the probability matrix governing transition between
current (p) and future (q) realisations of the TFP shock for country group j equal,9
πxj,p,q =

(1− ρj,x)Π + ρj,x (1− ρj,x)Π
(1− ρj,x)Π (1− ρj,x)Π + ρj,x


The transition matrix for the shock to the volatility of TFP (πvj,p,q) is also constructed
this way.
The three Markov chains underlying the discretised productivity process combine to yield
an 8 × 8 transition matrix. The shocks to TFP and the volatility of TFP are assumed
to be independent of one another both within and between country groups.
9This is a common method, used by Mendoza (1991) and Cochrane (1988) among others.
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1.1.4 Computation
Here we provide a broad outline of our approach to numerically approximating the world
economy model. See the Appendix in Section 1.7 for a more detailed explanation of this
method. The problem facing the individual country (firm-household) is solved for a
given discount factor (β) by applying an adapted version of the Endogenous Gridpoint
Method (EGM) introduced by Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2015) to a discretised state
space.10 The main outcome of this procedure is a set of optimal policy rules for possible
realisations of the productivity process and evenly spaced grids for bond holdings and
the capital stock. The bounds of the bond and capital grids are found through trial
and error: over repeated approximations of the model, the limits of the state space are
adjusted until we identify the set which adequately captures the stochastic stationary
distribution, m(b, k, z). The number of gridpoints is 150 for bond holdings and 300 for
the capital stock.
In the next step of the computation we move from the policy rules defining the choices
of the individual country to a characterisation of the optimal decisions made by the
continuum of economies comprising the world economy. To do this, we must first recast
the policy functions over a more finely divided variant of our initial state space by
applying linear interpolation to our original optimal decision rules. These modified
policy rules are combined with the transition probability matrix for the productivity
process to estimate the stochastic stationary distribution of countries over the state
space. If the world bond market clears then the algorithm is complete; otherwise, we
guess a new discount rate and repeat the steps beginning with the approximation of
the firm-household policy rules. The assessment of solution accuracy in the Appendix
in Section 1.8 indicates that our computation method achieves an acceptable degree of
precision.
10The EGM was originally introduced by Carroll (2006).
16
1.2 Results
The discussion of our results is divided into four sections. Firstly, an outline of key
business cycle moments for the benchmark model with time-varying volatility is provided.
We move on to describe the international distribution of external balances in versions
of the world economy model with and without shocks to the volatility of TFP. Then we
consider how financial frictions influence the concentration of external balances. Finally,
a sensitivity analysis is presented.
As we move from one version of the model to the next, we always clearly indicate
any departures from the benchmark parameter set. When approximating the model
under these alternative parameterisations, the discount factor necessary for bond market
clearing also deviates from its benchmark level.
1.2.1 Business Cycle Moments
Before exploring the distribution of external balances, we assess the realism of business
cycle dynamics in the benchmark version of one of the small open economies in our global
framework featuring time-varying volatility shocks. Table 1.3 reports key long-run busi-
ness cycle moments. Counterpart statistics from the data are also displayed. The model
does a reasonably good job of approximating the data for both developed and develop-
ing/emerging market countries. Output variability and autocorrelation clearly resemble
the data. The volatilities of key aggregates are realistic multiples of output volatility.11
Importantly, the small open economy’s trade balance is countercyclical.
The difference between the relative volatility of consumption (σc/σy) for each country
11It should be noted that consumption in the model captures household expenditure on nondurable
goods whereas our data on consumption includes both durable and nondurable goods. Since durables
consumption is more valatile than nondurable consumption, a model consistent data moment for con-
sumption, excluding durables expenditure, would be lower than the one in the table. So, the volatility
of consumption in the model is probably best viewed as being greater than the most appropriate data
moment though not by an unacceptable amount. It would be very difficult to obtain more disaggregated
data for the broad group of countries in our sample and consequently, we’re not able to provide a more
directly comparable data moment for consumption.
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Table 1.3: Business Cycle Moments
Data Model
Developed Developing/EM Developed Developing/EM
σy (%) 4.56 7.57 3.69 8.12
σc/σy 0.98 0.99 1.03 0.86
σi/σy 2.56 3.11 2.78 3.07
σtb/σy 0.52 0.55 0.65 0.59
ρ(c, y) 0.77 0.77 0.80 0.85
ρ(i, y) 0.59 0.41 0.69 0.69
ρ(tb, y) -0.04 -0.06 -0.16 -0.08
ρ(y, y
−1) 0.62 0.60 0.64 0.60
All data was detrended with a quadratic time trend. Each listed moment is the mean
for the country group. Details of the data are provided in the Appendix in Section 1.5.
Variables: y is output, c is consumption, i is gross investment, and tb is the trade balance.
group in the model deserves further comment. When the standard deviation of TFP
in our model calibration is increased (by increasing σj,x and σj,v), the relative volatility
of consumption falls. Consequently, the relative volatility of consumption is higher for
developed countries than it is for developing/emerging market nations in our approxi-
mations of the model. This ranking contradicts the typical observation from the data
which shows the relative volatility of consumption to be higher for developing/emerging
market countries. The model presented by Chang, Kim and Lee (2013), which has a sim-
ilar structure to our own, also exhibits decreases in the relative volatility of consumption
when the standard deviation of innovations to TFP increases. Although the ranking of
consumption variabilities in our model does not conform with the data, we still view the
levels for each region as being acceptable.
1.2.2 Distribution: Model without time-varying volatility shocks
The statistics presented in Table 1.4 indicate that when each artificial small open econ-
omy is not subject to volatility shocks, there is a sizeable margin between the dispersion
of external balances in the model and the data. Even the performance on net for-
eign assets, where this version of the model fares best, leaves about 38 percent of the
cross-country variation in the data unexplained. The interquantile ranges in Table 1.5
offer additional evidence of the discrepancy between dispersion in the model without
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time-varying volatility and the data.
Interestingly, the multi-country framework presented by Chang et al. (2013), which
also features constant volatility of TFP, produced an international standard deviation
of net foreign assets in line with the data. The most relevant distinction between our
model without time-varying volatility and their’s is the type of borrowing constraint in
force: we employ a collateral constraint while they have a fixed limit, thus suggesting
that in the presence of our more onerous, and arguably more realistic credit restriction,
some other driver of precautionary saving is needed to bring the model in line with the
data.
Table 1.4: The Role of Time-Varying Volatility in the Benchmark Model
Standard Deviation Fit
Model Model
Data no tvv with tvv no tvv with tvv tvv share
NFA/Y 56.5 35.2 52.8 62.2 93.4 33.3
CA/Y 5.7 2.3 3.1 41.1 53.5 23.3
TB/Y 14.7 2.7 3.7 18.6 25.3 26.3
All variables measured in percent. The terms no tvv and with tvv respectively denote
the benchmark model without and with time-varying volatility. Fit measures the pro-
portion of standard deviation in the data accounted for by the model. The tvv share
measure indicates the proportion of standard deviation in the with tvv model accounted
for by the presence of time-varying volatility. Data sample includes 21 developed coun-
tries and 76 developing/emerging market countries. See Appendix in Section 1.5 for
details of the data sample. The benchmark year is 2006. NFA/Y, CA/Y and TB/Y
denote net foreign assets, current account and trade balance, each as a proportion of
GDP.
1.2.3 Distribution: Model with time-varying volatility shocks
As Table 1.4 shows, once the productivity process has been augmented with time-varying
volatility shocks, the model generated global distribution of net foreign assets positions
moves much closer to the data, explaining 93 percent of the international dispersion;
the volatility shocks account for a substantial proportion (33 percent) of this variation.
The close correspondence between net foreign asset dispersion in the model and data is
emphasised by Figure 1.1. Furthermore, after breaking our approximated distribution
into quantiles in Table 1.5, it is also apparent that the model performs well for stock
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positions, with interquantile ranges covering both the core and breadth of net foreign
asset positions bearing clear resemblance to the data.
Table 1.5: Interquantile Fit: Data vs. Benchmark Model
Interquantile Fit
20v1 10v1 4v1 3v2
NFA/Y no tvv 0.69 0.70 0.71 0.46
with tvv 0.98 1.04 1.09 0.93
CA/Y no tvv 0.43 0.44 0.45 0.42
with tvv 0.56 0.58 0.57 0.47
TB/Y no tvv 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.19
with tvv 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.27
Interquantile Fit measures the range between the mean external
balance within each of the stated quantiles in the model as a pro-
portion of the same range in the data. 20v1 divides the distribution
into 20 quantiles and then compares the average external balance
in each of the 20th and 1st quantiles; 10v1 compares the average
in each of the 10th and 1st deciles; 4v1 compares the average in
each of the 4th and 1st quartiles; and 3v2 compares the average
in each of the 3rd and 2nd quartiles. Data sample includes 21 de-
veloped and 76 developing/emerging market countries. Benchmark
year is 2006. See Appendix in Section 1.5 for details of data sam-
ple. NFA/Y, CA/Y and TB/Y denote net foreign assets, current
account and trade balance, each as a proportion of GDP.
Further insight is provided in Figure 1.2, which shows how the proportion of countries at
each level of net foreign asset holdings differs between approximations with and without
time-varying volatility. The presence of macroeconomic uncertainty, in the form of
disturbances to the volatility of TFP, widens the range of possible productivity levels
an economy can experience, which in turn, leads to greater international diversity in
lending and borrowing decisions; ultimately, the pattern in Figure 1.2 emerges, with
fewer countries having relatively low asset or low liability positions versus the rest of the
world, and more nations at comparatively extreme levels of net foreign assets.
In contrast to the results for net foreign assets, the dispersion of current account and
trade balance positions in the model with time-varying volatility are far smaller than
the data. This divergence is apparent in the cross-country standard deviation, the
interquantile fit statistics and Figure 1.1. The spread of the flow external balances
was also underestimated in the model presented by Chang et al. (2013), and they
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Figure 1.1: Distribution of External Balances in Benchmark Model (with tvv)
21
Figure 1.2: The Impact of Macroeconomic Uncertainty on Net Foreign Assets
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surmise that the absence of terms of trade movements in their framework, as is the
case in our own model, may help explain the inconsistency. Alternatively, real exchange
rate movements, which are also absent from our model, might be helpful since they
can influence international trade, external asset and liability valuations, and a country’s
capacity to engage in collateralised borrowing. While each of these conjectures appear
plausible, they remain quantitative questions that are beyond the scope of this paper. An
initial effort to address these issue in Hughes (2016) involving the quantitative analysis
of a world economy model featuring real exchange rate fluctuations (but not terms of
trade movements) finds the proportion of model generated international dispersion of
net foreign assets, the current account and the trade balance that can be attributed
to the effect of real exchange rate movements on a country’s incentive to engage in
intertemporal trade to be 23, 53 and 35 percent respectively. Although preliminary, this
finding does suggest a substantial role for real exchange rate movements, particularly in
the determination of the cross-country concentration of flow external balances.
When we consider the development level subgroups of our world economy in Table 1.6
the model still performs well for stock external balances and poorly for flows. The
standard deviation of net foreign assets in developing/emerging market countries is close
to the data. Although the model appears to mis-estimate the spread of net foreign
assets in developed countries by a larger margin, the standard deviation in the data is
unrealistically inflated by a relatively extreme observation for a single country; removal
of this datapoint leads the dispersion of net foreign assets in the model to equal 89
percent of that in the data, a relatively small disparity.12 As in the global distribution,
macroeconomic uncertainty accounts for around one third of the dispersion of net foreign
assets at both levels of development. The congruence of the model with the data for net
foreign assets in each development group is illustrated in Figure 1.3.
12Although this extreme observation is considered an outlier for the developed country group, it is
not categorised as one on the world level since it does not fall outside the percentile bounds used to
construct the full sample (see Appendix in Section 1.5 for details). Furthermore, the dispersion of
developed country net foreign assets in the data declines by a substantial amount upon removing this
individual observation while the standard deviation for all countries moves by an insignificant amount
when the same observation is discarded.
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Table 1.6: The Distribution of External Balances by Country Group
Standard Deviation Fit
Model Model
Data no tvv with tvv no tvv with tvv tvv share
Panel A: Developed Countries
NFA/Y 57.6 26.0 40.1 45.2 69.5 35.0
CA/Y 7.5 1.4 1.8 19.3 23.6 18.2
TB/Y 13.1 1.8 2.4 13.8 18.4 25.0
Panel B: Developing/EM Countries
NFA/Y 56.4 43.3 63.9 76.8 113.4 32.2
CA/Y 5.1 3.1 4.1 60.0 79.7 24.8
TB/Y 14.6 3.5 4.8 24.2 32.9 26.4
All values measured in percent. The terms no tvv and with tvv respectively denote the benchmark
model without and with time-varying volatility. Fit measures the proportion of the standard deviation
in the data accounted for by the model. The tvv share measure indicates the proportion of standard
deviation in the with tvv model accounted for by the presence of time-varying volatility. Benchmark
year is 2006. See Appendix in Section 1.5 for details of the data.
1.2.4 Evolution of Distribution
Here, we quantitatively investigate how the global distribution of external balances is
influenced by financial liberalisation in the presence of macroeconomic uncertainty. Upon
integrating with international financial markets, a country gains access to expanded risk
sharing opportunities. Consequently, capital account liberalization has the potential to
alter precautionary saving activity and, in turn, international borrowing and lending
decisions. If the responsiveness of capital flows to macroeconomic uncertainty changes
with financial globalization, so will the cross-country diversity of external balances.
So far, our attention has been trained on the world in 2006, a time when international
financial integration was relatively widespread. To assess the impact of financial lib-
eralization, we ask how our key metrics of interest differ in alternative versions of the
world economy framework featuring more stringent financial frictions designed to proxy
for the greater restrictions on cross-border flows in 1986. Following Chang et al. (2013),
we adjust financial frictions in our model by changing the restrictiveness of the interest
rate spread and collateral constraint, one at a time. When the interest rate spread is in-
creased, borrowing becomes more costly and saving less rewarding, thereby reducing the
degree to which the firm-household resorts to trade in the international risk-free bond
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Figure 1.3: The Distribution of Net Foreign Assets by Development Group
in response to shocks; the international distribution of external balances then becomes
more concentrated. The impact of changes to the collateral constraint is slightly more
involved. In this scenario, the change in parameterisation is a decrease in the maximum
permitted leverage ratio (η). A tightening of this constraint implies the firm-household
has less capacity to use borrowing as a means of absorbing adverse shocks. In turn, the
cross-section of worldwide borrowing becomes less diffuse and gross global debt declines.
To increase global savings and restore bond market equilibrium, the discount factor de-
creases (i.e. the personal rate of time preference increases relative to the risk-free interest
rate on the bond). Taken together, these developments indicate that the dispersion of
external balances will decline under a more restrictive collateral constraint.13
When quantitatively analysing the evolution of external balances we depart from the
13For more detail on the dynamics of a deleveraging episode in closed and open economy settings see
Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2015) and Fornaro (2014) respectively.
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approach taken by Chang et al. in three notable respects. Firstly, as mentioned above,
we employ a collateral constraint on borrowing rather than the fixed limit present in
their framework, so the degree to which risk sharing opportunities expand with financial
openness in our test is constrained by the firm-household’s capital stock. Secondly, in
our experiments, we adjust the financial friction until the gross world debt to world GDP
ratio, a defining gauge of real-world financial globalization, matches the data for 1986,
whereas they focused on the plausibility of the smallest country-level net foreign asset to
GDP ratio in the model’s long-run stationary distribution. Thirdly, Chang et al. did not
allocate countries to developmental groupings and as a result, were not able to change
the composition of world GDP to match the data for 1986, as we do here.14
Table 1.7 contains the results of this experiment. Under the tightened version of the
collateral constraint, the cross-country dispersion of net foreign assets is 74 percent of
that in the data, while the corresponding proportion under the increased interest rate
spread is 83 percent. Although our benchmark approximations (repeated in Table 1.7)
achieved a closer fit, these experiments with more restrictive financial frictions still de-
liver an international concentration of net foreign assets of a similar order of magnitude
to the data in 1986. This outcome is suggestive of a substantial role for financial liberal-
isation in the diffusion of foreign asset holdings in the presence of time-varying volatility.
Moreover, macroeconomic uncertainty consistently accounts for around one third of this
dispersion of external stocks.
1.2.5 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we examine how the global distribution of external balances changes when
key parameters are adjusted. Under each scenario, the model is approximated with
and without time-varying volatility so that we can detect any changes to the relative
contribution of macroeconomic uncertainty, should they occur. Also, other than the
14The transition matrix for country group allocation is amended to obtain the developmental group
GDP weightings for 1986 in our sample panel; the same modified allocation matrix is used throughout
these tests. In our data, developed countries generate 64 percent of global GDP in 1986.
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Table 1.7: The Evolving Distribution of External Balances
Standard Deviation
Data Model Fit tvv share
Panel A: Adjusting the collateral constraint (year = 1986)
NFA/Y 46.4 34.5 74.4 29.0
CA/Y 4.5 2.7 64.2 21.1
TB/Y 9.1 3.0 33.0 22.6
Panel B: Adjusting the interest rate spread (year = 1986)
NFA/Y 46.4 38.4 82.8 39.9
CA/Y 4.5 2.7 65.6 25.1
TB/Y 9.1 3.1 34.5 28.3
Panel C: Benchmark (year = 2006)
NFA/Y 56.5 52.8 93.4 33.3
CA/Y 5.7 3.1 53.5 23.3
TB/Y 14.7 3.7 25.3 26.3
All values measured in percent. Fit measures the proportion of standard
deviation in the data accounted for by the model. The tvv share measure
indicates the proportion of standard deviation in the model accounted for by
the presence of time-varying volatility. Data covers 21 developed countries
and 76 developing/emerging market countries. See Appendix in Section 1.5
for details of the data.
discount factor, which adjusts to clear the bond market, all remaining parameters are
kept at benchmark 2006 values.
It is apparent from Table 1.8 that there is a strong negative association between the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution (1/γ) and the standard deviation of external
balances. Intuitively, since the desire for a smooth consumption path strengthens as
γ rises, so does the reliance on the shock absorbing capacity of saving, borrowing and
by implication, trade in foreign assets; the heightened responsiveness of foreign asset
holdings gives rise to a more diverse range of external balances.
The final column of Table 1.8 indicates the dispersion of external balances when the
interest rate spread (φ) has been increased. The spread used to test sensitivity here
equals the largest spread obtained from the data by Chang et al. (2013). Consistent
with the experiment in section 1.2.4, the standard deviation of external balances declines
as φ rises above its level in the benchmark model.
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Table 1.8: Sensitivity Analysis
Model
Data Benchmark γ = 2 γ = 8 φ = 0.5%
NFA/Y σ 56.5 52.8 34.2 73.3 11.1
tvv share – 33.3 37.9 27.9 62.7
CA/Y σ 5.7 3.1 3.0 3.1 1.8
tvv share – 23.3 24.9 23.2 46.3
TB/Y σ 14.7 3.7 3.3 4.2 1.9
tvv share – 26.3 26.7 25.1 47.3
All values measured in percent. The tvv share measure indicates the proportion of the
cross-country standard deviation (σ) under each parameterisation accounted for by the
presence of time-varying volatility. Data sample covers 21 developed countries and 76
developing/emerging market countries. Data year is 2006. See Appendix in Section 1.5
for details of data.
1.3 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper investigated how the precautionary response to country-specific macroeco-
nomic uncertainty influences the global distribution of external balances in a world econ-
omy model featuring incomplete international insurance markets. Uncertainty appears
in the guise of time-varying shocks to the volatility of national productivity. The quan-
titative implications of the model are limited to those stemming from intertemporal
optimisation, so, our framework is restricted to being a means for evaluating how much
cross-country dispersion of external balances can be expected to result from simple sub-
stitution of resources across time; the consequences of macroeconomic uncertainty are
viewed through this lens. Nevertheless, our framework still generates some notable in-
sights.
The international dispersion of net foreign assets in our benchmark model with time-
varying volatility amounts to about 90 percent of dispersion in the data for 2006. The
corresponding proportion when the model was re-calibrated to conditions in 1986 was 80
percent. Macroeconomic uncertainty steadily accounts for about one third of the model
generated cross-country variability of net foreign assets.
How do these findings contribute to the debate over the sustainability of the current
international distribution of cross-border holdings and the potential for a destabilising
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realignment in the future? There are many plausible drivers of capital flows that may
counteract or reinforce the basic optimising activity considered here. It remains to be
seen if the combination of these forces presents a material risk to economic stability.
Even so, our results do give reason to anticipate a substantial degree of cross-country
heterogeneity in foreign asset holdings that have been accumulated to satisfy the precau-
tionary saving motive; macroeconomic uncertainty stimulates this saving. As financial
frictions weaken, simple optimising behaviour exerts upward pressure on the interna-
tional dispersion of external balances. As a result, the current diversity of foreign asset
holdings might not necessarily be cause for alarm, and instead, could possibly be a
natural result of a stable underlying preference for a smooth consumption path.
While our world economy model was able to produce a spread of stock external balances
in line with the data, it was not able to do the same for flow balances. It’s possible
that we have the correct gauge of the flow response to the precautionary saving motive.
However, there is reason to suspect that refinements to our framework, including the
introduction of endogenous movements in the terms of trade and real exchange rate,
would offer a more reassuring grasp of the link between simple optimising behaviour and
the distribution of flow external balances. We leave this challenge for future work.
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1.5 Appendix A: Data
The panel covers the period from 1981 to 2010 and the following countries:
Developed
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.
Developing/Emerging Market
Argentina, Bangladesh, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Bu-
rundi, Cote d’Ivoire, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile,
China, Hong Kong, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Djibouti, Dominica, Do-
minican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala,
Guinea, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Lao, Mada-
gascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger,
Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra
Leone, South Africa, Sri Lanka, St. Vincent and Grenadines, Sudan, Suriname, Tai-
wan, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay,
Venezuela, Zambia.
Countries and timeframe were selected on the basis of data availability.
The frequency of the data is annual.
All data relating to GDP, the components of GDP, and price deflators was obtained
from the Penn World Table version 8.1 prepared by Feenstra, Inklaar and Timmer
(2014).
33
The net foreign assets (NFA), total liabilities and total assets series were obtained from
the External Wealth of Nations (EWN) dataset prepared by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2007). Total assets and total liabilities both include asset and liability positions in
portfolio equity, FDI, debt, and financial derivatives. In addition, total assets also
include FX reserves minus gold. NFA equals total assets less total liabilities. Adopting
the approach of Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013), we convert the EWN data from its





where P is the price of capital formation, CGDP is real GDP measured at current PPP,
and RGDP is real GDP at chained PPPs. The variables P, CGDP and RGDP were
obtained from the Penn World Tables.
Countries with extreme values of key variables (NFA to GDP, trade balance to GDP,
current account to GDP and GDP growth) were removed from the sample. Specifically,
exclusion occurred when the modulus of any key variable was equal to or greater than
the 99th percentile for that variable (in absolute terms) in one or more years.
Throughout the paper, the external balance variables are demeaned by year (i.e. the
cross-country mean for a given year is subtracted from each country observation for that
year) and then averaged over a 10-year rolling window.
1.6 Appendix B: The firm-household problem in detail
In recursive form, the problem facing the firm-household is,
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b′ ≥ −ηk′ (1.5)
R =
{
rl = r − φ for b
′ ≥ 0
rb = r + φ otherwise
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(1 + rb) = λ for b











if b′ = 0 (1.10)
For k′,
βE[Vk′(b
′, k′, z′)|z] + ηµ
1 + θ(k′ − k)
= λ (1.11)
where λ and µ are the Lagrange multipliers for the budget and collateral constraints
respectively.
The complementary slackness condition is,
−µ[b′ + ηk′] = 0
For the purposes of our numerical approximation we require the following envelope con-
ditions for b and k,
Vb = λ (1.12)
Vk = λ
(




1.7 Appendix C: Numerical Approximation
A solution for the global model has been obtained when we have satisfied the require-
ments of the stationary recursive competitive equilibrium (specified in section 1.1.2) to
an acceptable degree of accuracy. Therefore, our numerical approximation is tasked
with finding the policy rules, value function, world interest rate and probability distri-
bution of countries over states such that: the policy rules and value function solve the
firm-household problem (represented by optimality conditions (1.6)–(1.11)) given R; the
probability distribution m(b, k, x) is stationary and consistent with the policy rules and
shock process; and the world bond market clears.
The central component of our approximation is an adapted version of the endogenous
gridpoint method (EGM) introduced by Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2015). They applied
the nonlinear solution technique to a closed economy model in which household holdings
of government bonds and durable goods were the endogenous states. Our implementation
of the EGM occurs in stages 4 – 11 of the following solution algorithm:15
1. Specify discrete grids for bond holdings Gb = [b1, b2, ..., bnb], capital stock Gk =
[k1, k2, ..., knk], and the productivity shock Gz = [z1, z2, ..., znz].
2. Set n = 0. Guess initial discout factor (β).
3. Guess values for E[V nb′ (b
′, k′, z′)|z] and E[V nk′(b
′, k′, z′)|z] for n = 0. E[V nb′ (b
′, k′, z′)|z]
must be a decreasing function of b and E[V nk′(b
′, k′, z′)|z] a decreasing function of
k. Let V˜ nb (b
′, k′, z) = E[V nb′ (b
′, k′, z′)|z] and V˜ nk (b
′, k′, z) = E[V nk′(b
′, k′, z′)|z].
4. For each possible triple (k, k′, z) - where k ∈ Gk, k
′ ∈ Gk and z ∈ Gz - solve for
b′ that satisfies the following optimality conditions (which combine the optimality
conditions (1.8) – (1.11)):
(
1 + θ(k′ − k)
)
V˜ nb (b




for b′ > 0
15Matlab code for this algorithm is available on request. Our code is based on the Matlab code
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for − ηk′ < b′ < 0
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1 + θ(k′ − k)
)
V˜ nb (b




for b′ = −ηk′
5. For each (k, z) pair and the associated unconstrained range of b′ (where b′ ∈ Gb),
solve for k′ that meets the following conditions:16
(
1 + θ(k′ − k)
)
V˜ nb (b




for b′ ≥ 0
(
1 + θ(k′ − k)
)
V˜ nb (b




for − ηk′ < b′ < 0
6. For each combination (k, k′, b′, x) found in steps 4 – 5, compute Lagrange multi-














η − (1 + rb)
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′, k′, x) + ηµ(
1 + θ(k′ − k)
) (1.14)
When b′ > −ηk′ set µ = 0 and compute λ using (1.14).
16After completing step 4 we know the regions (defined in terms of k′) where the collateral constraint
does and does not bind for each (k, z) pair. As we approach b′ = 0 for a given (k, z) pair from b′ > 0
and b′ < 0, the change in b′ as we move from one point on the k′ grid to the next can become relatively
large. This is less than ideal since the distance that we are interpolating over in step 9 below increases
with the size of these jumps between values of b′. The approximation can more accurately capture the
non-linearities in the model if these gaps between optimal values of b′ can be narrowed. This can be most
efficiently achieved by using a different approach to recalculate the optimal combinations of (k, k′, b′, z)
over the region where the collateral constraint is not binding. This alternative involves finding the
optimal k′ for every (k, z, b′) triple for which the borrowing constraint is slack. This shortens the gap
between values of b′ to an acceptable size.
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7. For each combination (k, k′, b′, z, λ, µ) compute controls (c, l) and initial bond hold-




















8. For each combination (k, k′, b′, b, z, µ, λ, c, l) compute Vb(b, k, x) and Vk(b, k, x) us-




αxkα−1l1−α + (1− δ) + θ(k′ − k)
)
9. Since the values of b obtained in step 7 do not necessarily belong to the discrete grid
Gb, apply piecewise linear interpolation to the results of step 8 to obtain Vb(b, k, z)
and Vk(b, k, z) for b ∈ Gb and k ∈ Gk.
10. Use Vb(b, k, z) and Vk(b, k, z) from step 9, the transition probability matrix for
the productivity shock, and conditions X and Y to obtain E[V n+1b′ (b
′, k′, z′)|z]
and E[V n+1k′ (b
′, k′, z′)|z] for each possible discrete state. Let V˜ n+1b (b
′, k′, z) =
E[V n+1b′ (b
′, k′, z′)|z] and V˜ n+1k (b
′, k′, z) = E[V n+1k′ (b
′, k′, z′)|z].
11. If the maximum absolute distance between V˜ n+1a and V˜
n
a for a = k, b is less than
1e-4 then search for firm-household equilibrium is complete. Otherwise, repeat
steps 4 through 10 using V˜ n+1b (b
′, k′, x) and V˜ n+1k (b
′, k′, x) and set n = n+ 1.
12. Use linear interpolation to compute decision rules from firm-household equilibrium
over finer grids for bond holdings and capital stock. Label fine grids Gbf and Gkf .
13. Use the policy rules for bond holdings and capital stock from step 12 in conjunction
with the transition probability matrix for the productivity shock to compute the
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invariant probability distribution, m(b, k, z). For all b ∈ Gbf , k ∈ Gkf and z ∈ Gz,
iterate on the conditional distribution of state variables using the formula,
mj(b





where j denotes iteration number and pr(z′|z) is the probability of zt+1 = z
′ when
zt = z. Repeat iterations until absolute difference between mj and mj−1 is less
than 1e-7.
14. Compute net global bond holdings using stationary distribution m. If global net
bond holdings are less than 1e-3 then solution is complete as bond market is viewed
as being cleared. Otherwise, guess new discount factor and return to step 3.
1.8 Appendix D: Accuracy of Numerical Approximation
Following standard practice, we assess the accuracy of our approximation using the
normalised Euler equation error measure proposed by Judd (1992). This approach places
an economic value (measured in units of consumption) on the difference between the
approximated decisions of the firm-household and choices that are perfectly consistent
with the model’s optimality conditions. Rearranging the Euler equations for states
where the collateral constraint is not binding (i.e. µ = 0) we obtain the normalized
































where b′ and k′ are the values of the policy functions for bond holdings and capital stock
in state (k, b, z). The expectation is computed over the possible values of the shock next
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period (z′). The errors are measured in base-10 logarithms. Thus, an error of -3 indicates
the discrepancy between approximated and perfectly model consistent decisions equals
$1 for every $1, 000 spent on consumption. All error metrics are calculated using states
where the collateral constraint does not bind. We report the maximum error (Max1), the
maximum error over the stochastic stationary distribution (Max2), and the mean error
calculated using the probability weights of the stochastic stationary distribution (Mean).
The results of this accuracy test for our benchmark model with time-varying volatility
are displayed in Table 1.9. All errors indicate an acceptable level of accuracy.
Table 1.9: Normalised Euler Equation Errors
Max1 Max2 Mean
EEb -3.0 -3.3 -4.2
EEk -3.1 -3.4 -4.2
All errors measured in base-10 logarithms.
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Chapter 2
Real Exchange Rate Variation
and the Global Distribution of
External Balances
I investigate the effect of real exchange rate movements on the international
distribution of external balances in a model world economy featuring incom-
plete markets. Intertemporal trade between nations is the only means of in-
suring against country-specific uncertainty. By changing the return to de-
laying consumption, fluctuations in the real exchange rate influence the ac-
cumulation of foreign assets. In a plausibly calibrated approximation of the
model, the proportion of the cross-country dispersion of net foreign assets,
the current account and the trade balance that can be attributed to the effect
of real exchange rate movements is 23, 35 and 53 percent respectively.
In an uncertain multi-country environment featuring real exchange rate fluctuations, how
much of the international dispersion of external balances can we expect to result from
basic intertemporal substitution of consumption? And, do variations in the real exchange
rate play an economically meaningful role in this relationship? We present a preliminary
response to these questions by quantitatively analysing a model world economy built from
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a continuum of two-sector small open endowment economies. Intertemporal trade among
nations arises as a precautionary response to country-specific endowment shocks. In this
framework, variation in the expected path of real exchange rates alters the effective
return to postponing consumption, thereby affecting foreign asset accumulation and
ultimately, the cross-country concentration of external balances. As we shall see below,
the net effect of real exchange rate movements on intertemporal substitution depends on
a tradeoff between two conflicting dynamics. Existing work has not sought to numerically
approximate the outcome of this tradeoff in an integrated global framework.
How can real exchange rate movements specifically affect intertemporal trade between
nations? Consider a small open economy, populated by a representative household, that
lends to and borrows from other nations using a risk-free non-state-contingent bond
denominated in units of an internationally traded good.1 Each period this country
receives a stochastic and exogenous endowment containing tradable and nontradable
goods. Risk sharing opportunities are limited to the bond and there is a fixed limit on
borrowing to rule out the possibility of insolvency. There is no storage technology for
nontradables and so, the central decision facing the country is how to divide the tradable
part of the endowment between consumption and intertemporal trade. Changes in the
relative price of nontradable goods in terms of tradables are viewed as movements in the
real exchange rate. Now, suppose a disturbance leads to an expectation that the real
exchange rate is going to appreciate between this period and the next. Since interest
on the bond is paid in units of the tradable good, the expectation of a real exchange
rate appreciation implies a decrease in the return to saving or an easing of the cost of
borrowing. As a result, there is an impetus for the country to bring forward tradables
consumption in proportion to the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. At the same
time, the expectation that the real exchange rate is going to appreciate also means
that the relative price of tradables is expected to fall, and so, there is reason for the
country to postpone tradables consumption in proportion to the elasticity of substitution
1This example makes use of the mechanism presented Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, Ch. 4). We present
more rigorous coverage of their argument in section 2.1.2.
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between tradable and nontradable goods. Overall, there is a tradeoff stemming from
changes to real exchange rate expectations, the outcome of which depends on the size
of the two aforementioned elasticities. Only when both elasticities are the same do
movements in real exchange rate expectations not alter consumption growth. Since
changes to tradable consumption growth are accompanied by changes in bond holdings in
this example, real exchange rate movements affect intertemporal trade between nations
whenever the elasticity of intertemporal substitution does not equal the elasticity of
substitution between tradable and nontradable goods.
Assuming this mechanism is present in all countries comprising the world economy, it
is apparent that the association between the expected path of the real exchange rate
and cross-country asset trade has the potential to influence the global distribution of
external balances. Individual countries lend and borrow internationally to insure against
endowment shocks. Therefore, as long as shocks histories vary by country, so will bond
holdings. In turn, whenever real exchange rate movements influence how an individual
country accumulates bonds in response to uncertainty, they will also affect the global
distribution of external balances. In this paper, we use numerical approximations of
a model world economy to quantify this relationship between the real exchange rate
and the international distribution of external balances. Moreover, since tax policy and
foreign exchange reserve accumulation can be used to manipulate the real exchange rate,
our global framework, where intertemporal trade is influenced by movements in the real
exchange rate, would be a suitable foundation for future work seeking to evaluate the
effect of such policies on the international distribution of external balances. The analysis
presented in this paper and the proposed extension will offer further insight into the
factors driving the substantial and growing dispersion of external balances observed in
the data (see Table 2.1).
In our world economy model, each country is an ex ante identical replica of the two-sector
small open endowment economy in the preceding example. Country specific endowment
shocks give rise to ex post heterogeneity amongst nations. There are no global distur-
43







All variables measured in percent. Standard Deviation equals the
cross-country standard deviation of the respective external balance
in the specified year. All variables demeaned by year then averaged
over rolling 10-year window. Data covers 97 countries and the years
1986-2006. See the Appendix in Section 2.5 for detailed description
of data.
bances. It should be noted that the choice to adopt this relatively simple approach to
global equilibrium is guided by our desire to begin the exploration of how real exchange
rate movements influence the basic precautionary response to income uncertainty in the
absence of other impediments to or stimulants of cross-border asset flows, and for that
reason, this model does not incorporate several factors that have been proposed in the
literature as important drivers of international capital movement.2
We calibrate the model using a multicountry panel which combines data from the Penn
World Tables, the Groningen Growth and Development Centre 10-sector database, and
the External Wealth of Nations database prepared by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007).
We approximate the model using an endogenous gridpoint method. In our analysis, coun-
tries are allocated to one of two developmental groups (developed or developing/emerging
market). In the data, the volatility of GDP in developing/emerging market countries is
a substantial amount higher than it is in developed nations. To capture this observation,
the volatility of the stochastic endowment varies between developmental groups.
As is evident from the preceding description of the mechanism linking real exchange rate
movements and external balances, the elasticities of intertemporal and intratemporal
substitution are central to our investigation. We employ several plausible combinations of
these parameters to illustrate the role of the real exchange rate. Our main concern when
conducting this quantitative analysis is the long-run distribution of external balances.
2The literature review below provides references that explain some of the excluded factors that have
been used to explain the pattern of capital movement observed in the data.
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Broadly speaking, we find the effect of real exchange rate movements on the dispersion of
external balances grows as the elasticity of intratemporal substitution increases relative
to the elasticity of intertemporal subststution, in line with the aforementioned theory
mechanism. The overall explanatory power of the model varies between stock and flow
external balances. More specifically, under our preferred parameter set, the distribution
of net foreign assets in the model is about 88 percent as spread out as the data.3 Although
the model’s ability to explain the current account and trade balance is lower at 35 and 19
percent respectively, there is some suggestion that the real exchange rate plays a larger
role in determining those flow balances. Our numerical approximations suggest the
presence of real exchange rate fluctuations accounts for 23 percent of the international
dispersion of net foreign asset holdings. The corresponding statistics for the current
account and trade balance are 52 and 35 percent respectively. These preliminary results
lead us to tentatively contend that the real exchange rate should be considered a relevant
variable when analysing the aggregate outcome of simple intertemporal substitution of
consumption in a global context.
Relevant Literature Broadly speaking, this paper adds to the body of literature that
seeks to explain changes in the cross-country diversity of external balances that have oc-
curred since the 1980s.4 Within this strand of the literature our investigation is most
directly related to the theory work that assigns an important role to real exchange rate
movements in efforts to account for selected developments in the observed international
distribution of external balances. Several such models highlight the role of government
policy in stimulating capital flows. Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber (2003) contend
that certain emerging market governments undervalue their exchange rates through the
3When discussing the results of our quantitative analysis the term net foreign assets is used to refer
to the net foreign assets to GDP ratio. Current account and trade balance also refer to values scaled by
GDP.
4Contributions on the theory side of this field include, but are not limited to, Caballero, Farhi and
Gourinchas (2008), Devereux and Sutherland (2010), Durdu, Mendoza and Terrones (2007), Fogli and
Perri (2006, 2015), and Mendoza, Quadrini and Rios-Rull (2009). Amongst the contributions on the
empirical side are Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan and Volosovych (2014), Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013), and
Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor(2010). A helpful survey of this literature is provided by Gourinchas
and Rey (2014).
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purchase of foreign assets so as to generate export-led growth in their home economy.
Similarly, papers by Aizenman and Lee (2010), Benigno and Fornaro (2012) and Korinek
and Serven (2016), put forward frameworks in which a developing/emerging market gov-
ernment is able to realise a productivity enhancing learning-by-doing externality for do-
mestic firms when it uses the accumulation of foreign assets to engineer a real exchange
rate depreciation. In contrast to this work, we abstract from government intervention
and simply provide a first pass at quantifying how market driven real exchange rate
movements influence intertemporal substitution and in turn, alter the international dis-
tribution of external balances. As we discuss in Section 3.4, this paper is an exploratory
first step toward developing a multi-country framework that can be used to approximate
the impact of policy induced changes in the real exchange rate on the global distribution
of cross-border asset holdings.
Furthermore, we also add to the literature that uses a world economy framework featur-
ing incomplete markets as a basis for estimating how much of the international diversity
of external balances can be attributed to intertemporal substitution.5 Work in this field
has not attempted to quantify how goods prices might influence the international dis-
persion of cross-border flows so our contribution stems from our focus on the effect of
real exchange rate fluctuations.6
The remainder of this paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 contains a description
of our world economy model along with details of the parameterisation and numerical
approximation method we employ. Section 3 contains the results of our quantitative
analysis, and section 4 offers some concluding comments.
5The world economy framework in these papers is an open economy version of the closed economy
Bewley-Aiyagari-Huggett type model with the households in the closed economy setup being replaced
by countries here. The most relevant contributions on this topic include Chang, Kim and Lee (2013),
Sandri (2011), and Hughes (2016).
6Fornaro (2014) uses a world economy framework with similarities to our own to assess the macroeco-
nomic consequences of different exchange rate regimes during an international debt deleveraging episode.
That paper incorporates goods price movements but does not attempt to isolate how the presence of
real exchange rate fluctuations changes the long-run distribution of external balances.
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2.1 World Economy Model
Consider a world economy comprised of a continuum of two-sector small open economies
(countries). Time is discrete and indexed by t. Residing in each country is an infinitely
lived representative household whose objective is to maximise the present value of its









where Ct is consumption of a composite good in period t, β is the subjective discount
factor, γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and E0 is the expectations operator
conditional on information available at time zero. The composite consumption good













where CT,t and CN,t are tradable and nontradable consumption respectively, α is the
weighting factor for tradable goods, and η is the elasticity of substitution between trad-
able and nontradable goods.
Each period the household is endowed with stochastic and exogenous quantities of trad-
able (YT,t) and nontradable (YN,t) goods. The stochastic structure of the endowment
processes is described in Section 2.1.3. All nontradables are consumed in the period
of receipt; that is, CN,t = YN,t. Opportunities to insure against endowment shocks
are limited to an internationally traded one period non-contingent risk-free bond (Bt)
denominated in units of the tradable good and paying interest r. Following Mendoza
(1991), we require household debt to not exceed a fixed limit (B¯) that rules out the pos-
sibility of insolvency and Ponzi schemes. The household’s bond holdings in the model
are considered to be a proxy for net foreign assets, and when Bt < 0 the household is a
net debtor.
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The household budget constraint is,
CT,t + pN,tCN,t +
Bt+1
1 + r
= YT,t + pN,tYN,t +Bt (2.2)
where the per unit price of the tradable good is normalised to one and the price of
the nontradable good in units of the tradable good is pN,t. We assume PPP holds for
tradable goods, thus allowing us to view pN,t as as a proxy for the real exchange rate. In
conjunction with the requirement that all nontradable income be consumed, constraint
(2.2) indicates that the problem facing the household boils down to a decision over how
to divide its tradable endowment between consumption and intertemporal trade.
2.1.1 Global Equilibrium
The household chooses CT,t, CN,t and Bt+1 to maximise utility (2.1), subject to the
budget constraint (2.2) and the debt limit. In recursive form, the problem facing the
household is,


























The usual convention of no subscript and prime superscript signify current and next
period timing of state and control variables. The state space for each country includes
bond holdings (B) and the exogenous endowment vector y = (YT , YN ). The sets of all
possible values of B and y are denoted B and Y respectively.
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The following optimality conditions characterise the problem facing the household,
UT = β(1 + r)U
′









µ(B′ − B¯) = 0 (2.5)
where UT is the first derivative of the utility function with respect to CT , and µ is the
shadow cost of the credit constraint. When the borrowing constraint is slack, condition
(2.3) simply implies the agent will choose an intertemporal allocation of resources that
equalises the marginal utilities of current and next period tradables consumption. A
binding debt limit (as captured by µ > 0) gives rise to a disparity between the benefit of
incremental changes in current and future tradable consumption. Condition (2.4) equates
the marginal rate of substitution between tradable and nontradable goods with the
relative price of nontradables. Ceteris paribus, when tradable goods become relatively
more expensive (i.e when pN falls), the demand for tradables (CT ) declines. Condition
(2.5) is the complementary slackness requirement for bond holdings.
The stationary competitive equilibrium for the global economy comprises: (i) the deci-
sion rules CT (B,y) and B
′(B,y) along with the price schedule pN (B,y); (ii) the value
function V (B,y); (iii) the world interest rate r; and (iv) the probability distribution of
countries across states m(B,y) such that,





and value function V (B,y) are optimal
given pN (B
′,y) and r;
- the probability distribution, m(B,y), is stationary and consistent with the endow-
ment process, optimal decision rules and price schedule;





2.1.2 The Real Exchange Rate and Foreign Asset Accumulation
Here we draw on the exposition provided by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, chapter 4)
to describe the mechanism linking movements in pN with intertemporal trade between
countries. We focus on the behaviour of an individual country. Total expenditure on
the composite consumption good within this economy is,
PtCt = CT,t + pN,tCN,t (2.6)
where Pt is the price of one unit of the composite consumption good in terms of the
tradable good. Since the CES Armington aggregator underlies the composite good, the
aggregate price level, Pt, in equilibrium is,
Pt =
[
αη + (1− α)ηp1−ηN,t
] 1
1−η (2.7)
A movement in Pt implies the real exchange rate has changed. Combining (2.4), (2.6)







Demand for CN can be derived by similar means. When we recast the household prob-
lem as a decision regarding expenditure on the composite consumption good, the Euler








β(1 + r)Cγt (2.9)
Substituting (2.8) in (2.9) brings us to a relationship linking the optimal path of CT
with expected changes in P . Specifically,
Et[CT,t+1] = β
1











Since the trade balance is directly influenced by CT , condition (2.10) also indicates how
expected price movements can affect foreign asset accumulation. The key driver of this
50
association is the size of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (1/γ) relative to the
size of the elasticity of intratemporal substitution (η).
We illustrate the role of these parameters by way of an example where a negative trad-
able endowment shock at date t brings about an expectation that the aggregate price
level will increase between t and t + 1. The magnitude of the accompanying decrease
in CT,t depends on a tradeoff between two competing effects. On the one hand, the
expected price increase implies a lowering of the interest rate denominated in units of
composite consumption; in turn, this decreases the return to lending and thus prompts
the household to substitute CT,t for CT,t+1 in proportion to 1/γ. We term this change
in CT,t the interest rate effect. On the other hand, the expected rise in the aggregate
price level is a corollary of an expected increase in the relative price of nontradables,
pN ; as a result, the relative price of the tradable good is expected to fall, thus provid-
ing the household with an incentive to substitute CT,t+1 for CT,t. We call this second
change the nontradable price effect. When 1/γ = η, the optimal intertemporal allocation
of resources is not influenced by the expected change in the aggregate price level, and
for that reason, growth of tradable consumption between t and t + 1 is the same as in
a single sector version of our endowment economy. If 1/γ > η the interest rate effect
exceeds the nontradable price effect and therefore, CT is expected to grow less than in
the scenario where 1/γ and η are equalised. The opposite occurs when 1/γ < η. As long
as there is a disparity between 1/γ and η, the consumption response to an endowment
shock will depend on the expected path of prices. Moreover, given CT determines the
trade balance in our endowment economy, it follows that foreign asset accumulation will
also respond to expectations regarding prices when 1/γ 6= η.
2.1.3 Parameters
The world economy model is solved using an endogenous gridpoint method based on
Korinek and Mendoza (2014) and Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2015).7 An outline of this
7The endogenous gridpoint method was first introduced by Carroll (2006).
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numerical solution algorithm is provided in the Appendix in Section 2.6.
In our quantitative analysis, one time period equals one year. In line with existing
multicountry models featuring incomplete markets, the market clearing interest rate (r)
is 4 percent. Conditional on r, we adjust the subjective discount factor (β) until the
world bond market clears. In all approximations, the solution has β(1 + r) < 1, thus
satisfying the standard theoretical requirement for a well-behaved long-run distribution
of bond holdings. As in Bengui, Mendoza and Quandrini (2013), the weight on tradable
goods in the Armington aggregator (α) is 0.3.
We prepare separate approximations of the model under differing combinations of the
elasticities of intertemporal and intratemporal substitution. Initially, we equalise the
two elasticities, denoted 1/γ and η respectively, so that we can approximate a version of
the long-run distribution for a scenario where consumption growth is not influenced by
real exchange rate movements. Then, we adjust η over a plausible range of values while
holding γ constant. This process is repeated for several levels of γ. When setting γ, we
remain within the extremes observed in the meta-analysis of several thousand empirical
estimates of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution by Havranek, Horvath, Irsova
and Rusnak (2015). In light of this, we consider values of 1/γ ranging from 1/8 through
1. For the elasticity of intratemporal substitution (η) we employ values extending from
the low of 0.44 estimated by Stockman and Tesar (1995), to the high of 1.28 estimated
by Ostry and Reinhart (1992).
Drawing on the work of Fornaro (2014) and Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2015), we select
the debt limit (B¯) at which the gross world debt to world GDP ratio in the version of
the model with η = 1γ is 18 percent, which is the average of the equivalent variable for
the 10-year window surrounding 2006 in the data. The debt limit remains constant at
this level when η is adjusted for a given γ, but is recalibrated each time we change γ so
that our analysis is able to isolate the effect of the mechanism described in section 2.1.2
and eliminate changes in dispersion stemming from movement in the debt limit.
The source of country heterogeneity is the realisation of the exogenous endowment pro-
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cess, which depends on three separate events. First, ex-ante identical economies enter a
lottery to determine their allocation between developed and devloping/emerging market
country groups. Subsequently, countries draw tradable (T) and nontradable (NT) en-
dowments. Volatility and persistence of endowments vary between country groups. We
approximate each event using a two state Markov chain. Consequently, there are eight
possible combinations of tradable and nontradable endowments.
The elements of the Markov chain determining country group allocation are chosen to
satisfy two conditions: (i) the developed countrys’ share of the global endowment valued
in units of the tradable good must equal the share of GDP generated by developed coun-
tries in our data for 20068; (ii) the probability of switching between developing/emerging
market and developed country groups must equal a rough estimate of the probability of
a non-OECD country joining the OECD in a given year.9
The transition probability matrix for the tradable and nontradable endowments in each
country group is prepared according to the ‘simple persistence rule’ used by Mendoza
(1991) and Bengui, Mendoza and Quadrini (2013). Let σs,j be the standard deviation of
the endowment for sector s ∈ [T,NT ] in country group j. Under the simple persistence
rule, the endowment autocorrelation for group j is required to be the same for both
sectors, and is labelled ρj . The contemporaneous correlation between tradable and
8This share was 54 percent and is based on a 97 country sample from the Penn World Tables. See
the Appendix in Section 2.5 for a detailed description of the data.
9We use OECD membership as a proxy for developed country status. In 1960, the OECD was
established and it had 20 members at that time. Our estimate begins with an approximation of the
typical number of countries outside the original 20 members for the years since the OECD’s inception.
We view 150 countries as a reasonable choice here. This implies there have been 8,250 country-year
observations for which we can record the membership status for these non-OECD nations. Another
15 countries joined the OECD over the 55 years through 2015. We remove the post-accession years
for these new members from our previous tally and are left with 7,881 observations. Therefore, 15
accessions to membership occurred during the 7,881 country-year observations, which can plausibly be
viewed as implying that the probability of gaining membership in a particular year was about 0.002.
This value is used as our rough estimate for the probability of switching from developing/emerging
market to developed in the transition matrix. To the best of my knowledge, a more precise and directly
applicable measure of this transition probability is not currently available in the literature. Using a
more finely divided scale of country income groupings than our own, Kremer, Onatski and Stock (2001)
estimated a transition probability matrix for country movement between income groupings using data
for 140 countries over the period 1960 through 1996. Although not directly comparable to our transition
probabilities due to its reliance on a different approach to grouping countries, their analysis does not
make our estimate seem unreasonable.
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nontradable endowments in group j is ρx,j . The mean value of the endowment in all
sectors and country groups is assumed to equal one and perturbations to each endowment
take one of two possible values equal to ±σs,j . In turn, the state space for the endowment
process in country group j is,
yj ∈
{
















where superscripts h and l signify high and low realisations of each endowment. The
probability of a country belonging to group j obtaining endowment combination n next
period given that it currently has endowment combination m is denoted πm,n,j and is
given by,
πm,n,j = (1− ρj)Πn,j + ρjI
where Πn,j is the long-run probability of state n for group j, and I is an indicator
that equals one when m = n and zero otherwise. It is assumed that Π(Y hT,j , Y
h
NT,j) =
Π(Y lT,j , Y
l








NT,j) = 0.5 − Π. Finally, ρx,j =
4Π− 1.
The parameters defining the behaviour of the tradable and nontradable endowments
are calibrated using panel data from the Groningen Growth and Development Centre
10 sector database constructed by Timmer, de Vries and de Vries (2014). Our sample
from this database covers 30 countries (22 developing/emerging market and 8 developed)
and the time period 1975 to 2009.10 We use the classification scheme proposed by De
Gregorio and Wolf (1994) to assign the 10 industrial sectors in the data to tradable
and nontradable categories.11 We take real gross value added for sector s in the data
to be the real world analogue for the sector s endowment in the model. Given this
correspondence, we set σs,j , ρj and ρx,j equal to their counterparts in the data. The
resulting parameters are displayed in Table 2.2.
10See Appendix 2.5 for a detailed description of this panel.
11The tradable sector includes: agriculture; hunting, forestry and fishing; mining and quarrying; man-
ufacturing; and transportation, storage and communication. The nontradable sector includes: electricity,
gas and water supply; construction; wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants; finance insurance
and real estate services; government services; and community, social and personal services.
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Table 2.2: Endowment Parameters
Symbol Developing/EM Developed
Standard Deviation (%) σs,j 5.22 (T) 5.51 (NT) 4.69 (T) 2.57 (NT)
Persistence ρj 0.74 0.60
Contemporaneous Correlation ρx,j 0.51 0.66
The sector (s) is labelled T for tradable and NT for nontradable. Country group is labelled j. All
endowment parameters based on data from the GGDC 10 sector Database. Sample cover 30 countries
and the time period 1975-2009. See Appendix 2.5 for detailed description of data.
2.2 Results
2.2.1 Business Cycle Moments
Business cycle moments describing dynamics in one of the countries comprising our
model world economy are shown in Table 2.3. The moments shown are based on an
approximation of the model with η = 0.86 and 1/γ = 1/4. These values of η and 1/γ
are not extreme relative to existing empirical estimates and as a result, they represent
our preferred parameterisation of the model. Due to the parsimonious structure of our
model and the need to abstract from a number of channels that influence business cycle
dynamics, we merely aim for the business cycle moments generated by the model to be
reasonable and do not expect a close correspondence with the data. The trade balance in
the model displays countercyclical behaviour but to a greater degree than the data. The
volatility of consumption and the trade balance relative to the volatility of output both
appear reasonable. Although the model generated variability of consumption seems a
little low compared to the data at first glance, part of the difference can be accounted
for by the fact that the consumption data includes durable and nondurable expenditure
while the model only includes nondurable expenditures. Since durable consumption is
more volatile than nondurable consumption in the data, the model consistent consump-
tion measure would most likely be less volatile than the one in the table and therefore,
closer to the model.
The volatility and autocorrelation of total GDP in units of tradables (Y) in the model
are both quite high compared to the data.12 The sectoral endowments (YT and YN )
12In the model total GDP in units of tradables is given by: Y = YT + pNYN .
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are both exogenous and thus, their model generated moments both match the data
precisely. Therefore, the discrepancy between model and data for total GDP is caused
by the behaviour of pN in the model, which is more persistent and volatile than the
data.13 A means of making the behaviour of Y in the model more realistic is not
currently apparent. It seems reasonable that future work incorporating terms of trade
fluctuations might help overcome this problem by providing another channel of external
adjustment that can lower the burden placed on pN in each economy’s response to a
disturbance. Alternatively, extensions to our setup featuring endogenous production
and labour supply might also bring the volatility and persistence of total GDP in the
model closer to the data.
Table 2.3: Business Cycle Moments
Data Model
Developed Developing/EM Developed Developing/EM
σ(Y ) 2.61 4.88 5.54 7.95
σ(pN ) 3.09 7.74 8.79 14.30
σ(C)/σ(Y ) 0.97 0.99 0.43 0.49
σ(TB)/σ(Y ) 0.52 0.55 0.44 0.40
ρ(C, Y ) 0.77 0.77 0.74 0.40
ρ(TB, Y ) -0.04 -0.06 -0.67 -0.78
ρ(Y, Y
−1) 0.58 0.70 0.94 0.95
ρ(pN , pN,−1) 0.52 0.62 0.85 0.84
All data was detrended with a quadratic time trend. Each listed moment is the mean
of the same statistic for the specified country group. Variables: Y is total GDP in
units of tradables, pN is the price of nontradables in terms of tradables, C is composite
consumption, and TB is the trade balance. Standard deviations are measured in percent.
All components of the data metrics σ(C)/σ(Y ), σ(TB)/σ(Y ), ρ(C, Y ) and ρ(TB, Y ) are
based on data from the Penn World Tables. The data moments σ(Y ), ρ(Y, Y−1), σ(pN )
and ρ(pN , pN,−1) are calculated using the GGDC dataset. Details of the data are provided
in the Appendix in Section 2.5.
2.2.2 Distribution of External Balances
The first two rows of statistics in each panel of Table 2.4 measure the international
dispersion of external balances when the elasticities of intertemporal and intratemporal
substitution are equalised. These model statistics characterise the concentration of stock
13The price of nontradable goods in terms of tradable goods in the data equals the nontradable sector
value added deflator as a proportion of the tradable sector value added deflator.
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external balances when changes in the expected path of pN do not effect consumption
growth.14 It is apparent from the results in Panel A that even when the role of the
real exchange rate in the determination of external balances is nullified, intertemporal
substitution of consumption at the country level can generate sizeable cross-country
diversity in foreign asset holdings, accounting for as much as 83 percent of the standard
deviation in the data. In contrast, the statistics presented in Panels B and C indicate
the international dispersion of trade balance and current account positions in the model
explains a far smaller proportion of variation in the data. A similar distinction between
the size of model generated stock and flow external balance dispersions relative to the
data was obtained in existing studies by Chang, Kim and Lee (2013) and Hughes (2016).
Since real exchange rate movements have the potential to modify how a country in our
world economy responds to an endowment shock, there is reason to believe the results
for parametrisations where η = 1/γ in Tables 2.4 are distorted by the absence of a factor
that plays a role in the decision to substitute resources intertemporally.
Rows 3 onward in Panels A through C of Table 2.4 gauge the standard deviation of
the international distributions of NFA, CA and TB positions respectively for assorted
plausible combinations of 1/γ and η other than pairs with 1/γ = η. Based on the
description provided in Section 2.1.2, the parameterisation with η < 1/γ should lead to
the change in external balances at the country level during the period of an endowment
shock (tradable or nontradable) being weaker than the outcome when the expected
path of prices doesn’t matter for intertemporal trade (i.e. when η = 1/γ). And, if
η > 1/γ the impact of the endowment shock is amplified relative to the response when
η = 1/γ. Therefore, as η rises relative to 1/γ the size of each country’s response to
the idiosyncratic endowment shocks also increases, and as a result, the international
14The reason for the non-monotonic changes in the dispersion of external balances (as a proportion of
GDP in units of tradables) as we move from left to right across the first row of each panel in Table 2.4
is that both η and 1/γ decrease as we move from one column to the next (since the results in the first
row of each panel all have η = 1/γ) and as a result, there is an accompanying change in the behaviour
of pN and in turn, the denominator of the external balance measure, GDP in units of tradables. The
standard deviation of unscaled Net Foreign Assets does increase monotonically as we move from left to
right across the first row.
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Table 2.4: International Distribution of External Balances
Panel A: Net Foreign Assets/GDP
η 1/γ = 1 1/2 1/4 1/8
1/γ 44.7 42.7 40.6 47.0
(79.1,∼) (75.6,∼) (71.9,∼) (83.2,∼)
0.44 41.7 42.1 44.6 54.3
(73.9,-6.6) (74.5,-1.3) (78.9,9.8) (96.1,15.5)
0.86 44.1 46.1 49.9 60.1
(78.0,-1.4) (81.5,7.9) (88.3,22.9) (1.06,27.9)
1.28 45.9 48.6 52.5 62.5
(81.3,2.8) (86.1,14.0) (92.9,29.2) (1.1,33.1)
Panel B: Current Account/GDP
η 1/γ = 1 1/2 1/4 1/8
1/γ 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4
(22.5,∼) (22.6,∼) (23.0,∼) (25.1,∼)
0.44 1.1 1.2 1.6 2.0
(19.3,-14.1) (21.8,-3.9) (27.5,19.9) (35.6,42.0)
0.86 1.2 1.6 2.0 2.4
(21.6,-3.9) (27.2,20.2) (35.1,52.7) (42.8,70.6)
1.28 1.4 1.8 2.3 2.6
(24.4,8.6) (31.6,39.5) (39.7,72.5) (46.3,84.6)
Panel C: Trade Balance/GDP
η 1/γ = 1 1/2 1/4 1/8
1/γ 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.4
(15.0,∼) (14.6,∼) (14.2,∼) (16.1,∼)
0.44 2.0 2.1 2.4 2.9
(13.7,-9.1) (14.3,-1.9) (16.2,13.9) (20.0,24.6)
0.86 2.2 2.4 2.8 3.4
(14.7,-2.3) (16.5,13.1) (19.3,35.4) (23.2,44.5)
1.28 2.3 2.7 3.1 3.6
(15.8,5.0) (18.2,24.8) (21.1,48.3) (24.8,54.2)
Each panel of the table shows the standard deviation of the international distribution of the stated external
balance in the model for each combination of 1/γ and η. The first statistic in parentheses is the proportion
of cross-country dispersion in the data for 2006 explained by the model. The second statistic in parentheses
is the proportion of the international standard deviation of the external balance in the model attributable to
real exchange rate fluctuations. All external balances are measured as a proportion of GDP. Data covers 97
countries (21 developed and 76 developing/emerging market). See the Appendix in Section 2.5 for a detailed
description of data.
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distribution of external balances should become more diffuse. Our results conform with
this theory mechanism linking real exchange rate movements and external balances in
each country.
When η grows in size relative to 1/γ, two key changes are observed in our results:
firstly, the proportion of the international dispersion of external balances in the data
explained by the model increases; secondly, the share of the model generated cross-
country standard deviation of external balances attributable to expectations regarding
price movements also expands. Alongside these observations it is also apparent that
the explanatory power of the model is uniformly higher for NFA than it is for the
flow external balances. Furthermore, despite the model’s weaker ability to explain the
overall dispersion of flow external balances, the results do suggest that the proportionate
contribution of expected price movements to model generated international dispersion is
larger for flow balances than it is for NFA. Under the plausible parameterisation where
η = 0.86 and 1/γ = 1/4, expectations regarding price movements account for about
53 percent of the international standard deviation of CA balances. The corresponding
proportion of the trade balance was 35 percent, though this share was smaller relative to
the data than it was for the CA. The share of the dispersion of NFA attributable to real
exchange rate expectations under the same parameters was comparatively low though
still meaningful at 23 percent.
These results give reason to suspect that price expectations, and in turn, real exchange
rate movements, might matter more for the flow external balances than they do for long-
run foreign asset accumulation. Moreover, the results also suggest that intertemporal
substitution of consumption may account for a larger share of the cross-country disper-
sion of external balances, in particular the CA, than previously thought since existing
quantitative analysis based on multi-country world economy models with similarities
to our own did not incorporate a role for real exchange movements. Future research,
which is discussed in more detail below, will need to more rigorously test these asser-
tions so that we can go beyond this exploratory analysis and provide a stronger inference
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on how real exchange rate movements influence the international diversity of external
balances.
The distribution of external balances in the version of the model with η = 0.86 and
1/γ = 1/4 is shown in Figure 2.1. The diagram also displays the distribution of the
demeaned external balances in the data. Qualitatively, the model and data are somewhat
similar though there are some key distinctions worth noting. The difference between the
spread of the model and data on flow balances is apparent. Also, stock external balances
are clustered around -0.5 (NFA/GDP = 50%) while the mode in the data is closer to
zero. This likely results from the absence of a spread between lending and borrowing
rates in our framework. Chang et al. (2013) found that incuding such a spread shifts
the modal NFA balance closer to zero. The addition of an interest rate spread was not
possible in our setup since doing so lowered the world debt to world GDP ratio by such
a large amount that it was not possible to achieve the requirements for calibrating the
debt limit detailed in Section 2.1.3.
2.3 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper looked into how real exchange rate variation might affect the international
distribution of external balances in an integrated world economy framework. Our ob-
jective was to develop some insight into the role of market driven real exchange rate
fluctuations in the decision to substitute resources intertemporally. Numerical approxi-
mations of the model hint at a relationship in which real exchange rate movements make
a substantial contribution to the international dispersion of external balances. As the
elasticity of intratemporal substitution increases relative to the elasticity of intertem-
poral substitution, the effect of real exchange rate expectations on the cross-country
dispersion of external balances can become economically meaningful. Under plausible
parameterisations of the model, the presence of real exchange rate movements in each
country’s decision making leads to sizeable increases in the global dispersion of cross-
border flows.
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Figure 2.1: The International Distribution of External Balances
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The results of this preliminary study point toward several potential avenues for future
research. Firstly, it would be worthwhile to introduce a distinction between domestic
and foreign tradable goods in the model so we can see how the international distribution
of external balances changes when country-level adjustment incorporates a more fully
developed trade channel featuring terms of trade fluctuations.15 Secondly, it would be
interesting to move from the endowment framework employed here to a world economy
setup in which both production and capital accumulation are endogenous so that we can
ascertain if the significance of real exchange rate fluctuations observed in this exploratory
paper carries over to an environment where each country’s current account depends on
both saving and investment (i.e the absorption approach). Existing work using this more
fully articulated approach but with a single industrial sector, and consequently no role
for goods prices, suggests that intertemporal substitution of consumption makes a rela-
tively large (small) contribution to the international dispersion of stock (flow) external
balances. Whether this distinction between results for stock and flow balances holds in
a version of the more sophisticated framework featuring real exchange rate movements
remains an open question. The third extension to our work would be the addition of
exchange rate policy to our world economy model, so that the frequently debated effects
of real exchange rate undervaluation on the cross-country concentration of external bal-
ances can be approximated in a global context. Papers such as Benigno, Chen, Otrok,
Rebucci and Young (2012) and Jeanne (2012) offer blueprints for how to implement such
government activity in a two-sector small open economy framework.
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2.5 Appendix A: Data
There are two distinct sections of the panel. The first is comprised of data taken from the
Penn World Tables and the External Wealth of Nations database. The second contains
data from the Groningen Growth and Development Centre 10-sector database. We now
describe each of these sections in turn.
Section 1
The first section of the panel covers the period from 1981 to 2010 and the following
countries:
Developed Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.
Developing/Emerging Market Argentina, Bangladesh, Belize, Benin, Bolivia,
Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cote d’Ivoire, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Cen-
tral African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Hong Kong, Colombia, Comoros, Costa
Rica, Cyprus, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia,
Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran,
Israel, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Lao, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mex-
ico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines,
Poland, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sri Lanka, St. Vincent
and Grenadines, Sudan, Suriname, Taiwan, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago,
Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia.
Countries and timeframe were selected on the basis of data availability.
The frequency of the data is annual.
All data relating to GDP, the components of GDP, and price deflators in this section of
the panel was obtained from the Penn World Table version 8.1 prepared by Feenstra,
Inklaar and Timmer (2014).
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The net foreign assets (NFA), total liabilities and total assets series were obtained from
the External Wealth of Nations (EWN) dataset prepared by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2007). Total assets and total liabilities both include asset and liability positions in
portfolio equity, FDI, debt, and financial derivatives. In addition, total assets also
include FX reserves minus gold. NFA equals total assets less total liabilities. Adopting
the approach of Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013), we convert the EWN data from its





where Pk is the price of capital formation, CGDP is real GDP measured at current PPP,
and RGDP is real GDP at chained PPPs. The variables Pk, CGDP and RGDP were
obtained from the Penn World Tables.
Countries with extreme values of key variables (NFA to GDP, trade balance to GDP,
current account to GDP and GDP growth) were removed from the sample. Specifically,
exclusion occurred when the modulus of any key variable was equal to or greater than
the 99th percentile for that variable (in absolute terms) in one or more years.
Throughout the paper, the external balance variables are demeaned by year (i.e. the
cross-country mean for a given year is subtracted from each country observation for that
year) and then averaged over a 10-year rolling window.
Section 2
The second section of the panel covers the period from 1975 to 2009 and the following
countries:
Developed Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, United Kingdom,
USA
Developing/Emerging Market Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco,
Senegal, Singapore, South Africa, Taiwan, Tanzania, Thailand, Zambia
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This section of the panel contains data from the GGDC 10-sector Database prepared by
Timmer, de Vries and de Vries (2014). Variables include gross value added by (ISIC)
industrial sector in current national prices and constant 2005 national prices. Sectoral
VA deflators are calculated using this data.
Countries and timeframe were selected on the basis of data availability. We increased
the timeframe covered by this section of the panel to compensate for the fact that only
a relatively small number of countries are available in the GGDC dataset.
2.6 Appendix B: Numerical Approximation
Here we detail our approach to approximating the world economy model.16 A solution
has been found when the conditions for the stationary recursive competitive equilibrium
specified in Section 2.1.1 have been satisfied to an acceptable degree of accuracy. We
begin by applying a synthesis of the endogenous gridpoint methods introduced by Guer-
rieri and Lorenzoni (2015) and Korinek and Mendoza (2014) to the household’s problem.
This involves iterating on the household Euler equation (2.3) to find the optimal policy
functions for a given β over a discretised version of the state space. Iterations continue
until the absolute difference between policy functions in consecutive iterations is suffi-
ciently small. Then, after recasting the optimal policy function for B over a finer grid we







where j denotes iteration number and pr(y′|y) is the probability of yt+1 = y
′ when
yt = y. Iterations continue until the absolute difference between mj and mj−1 is less
than 1e-7. If the world bond market clears given m(B,y) then the approximation is
complete. Otherwise, we guess a new β and repeat the procedure starting with the
household problem.
16Matlab code for this algorithm is available on request. Our code is based on the Matlab code
accompanying the papers by Korinek and Mendoza (2014) and Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2015).
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In accordance with standard practice, we assess the accuracy of the numerical approx-
imation using the normalised Euler equation error introduce by Judd (1992). In the
context of the household problem in our model, this error is given by,
EE = 1−
[





where C(B,y) and CT (B,y) are the policy rules for consumption of the composite good
and the tradable good respectively, B is bond holdings, y is the endowment vector and
ζ = (1 − ηγ)/η. Errors are measured in base-10 logarithms so, for example, when EE
equals 3 the difference between our approximated household decision and the perfectly
model consistent choice is $1 for every $1000 spent on tradables consumption. The error
is calculated for all states where the borrowing constraint does not bind. In addition to
the maximum error over all possible states (Max all), we also report the weighted mean
error calculated using probability weights from the model’s long-run distribution (Mean
ssd). The errors for the model with η = 0.86 and γ = 4 are displayed in Table 2.5. Both
error measures indicate an acceptable degree of accuracy. Other parameterisations of
the model achieve similar levels of accuracy.
Table 2.5: Normalised Euler Equation Errors
Max all Mean ssd
EE -2.23 -4.64
All errors measured in base-10 logarithms.
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Chapter 3
Exchange Rate Flexibility, the
International Balance Sheet and
Economic Recoveries
The link between exchange rate flexibility, the international balance sheet and
economic recoveries is analysed in this paper through the application of OLS
and two-stage least squares estimators to a dataset covering 201 recovery
episodes occurring between 1971 and 2007. An instrument representing the
history of exchange rate regime choice in the years immediately preceding the
recovery is used to identify exogenous variation in exchange rate flexibility for
the two-stage least squares procedure. Our results suggest that when exter-
nal foreign currency denominated debt liabilities are relatively large, a pegged
regime is associated with significantly faster real GDP growth than a non-
pegged arrangement during a recovery. This finding can be rationalised on
the basis that when external foreign currency denominated borrowing becomes
sufficiently large, the adverse balance sheet effects associated with higher lev-
els of exchange rate flexibility begin to significantly outweigh the beneficial
expenditure switching effects.
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Since the wake of the 2008-2009 financial crisis there has been a reinvigorated debate
over the way in which a country’s choice of exchange rate regime influences its ability to
recover from a recession. Much of this discussion has focused on whether more flexible
regimes aid recovery by allowing exchange rate depreciation to compensate for labour
market frictions that slow adjustment. Devaluation is expected to generate expenditure
switching effects through which a lower value of the home currency improves the com-
petitiveness of domestically produced goods, thereby boosting net exports and aiding
recovery. However, exchange rate movements also impact the valuation of external as-
sets and liabilities denominated in a foreign currency, and the ensuing changes in net
worth influence the recovery process as well. Thus, the ability of more flexible regimes
to facilitate recovery depends on the extent to which the expenditure switching effects
are tempered by the valuation effects. This paper investigates the outcome of this trade-
off during economic recovery episodes. Our key finding is that when foreign currency
debt is sufficiently large, a pegged exchange rate is associated with a recovery growth
rate that is significantly greater (in both statistical and economical terms) than that
achieved under a more flexible regime. In other words, our results suggest that when
foreign currency debt passes a threshold level, the adverse valuation effects stemming
from increased exchange rate flexibility begin to outweigh the beneficial expenditure
switching effects, and as a result, a pegged regime aids recovery.
Grounds for our focus on the recovery portion of the business cycle are as follows. An
empirical study by Cerra and Saxena (2005) suggests that income levels in countries
experiencing frequent recessions exhibit a tendency to fall behind income levels in na-
tions suffering fewer downturns since growth in the early stages of a typical recovery is
significantly less than the rate achieved during an average expansion year, and, as the
recovery proceeds, growth does not differ significantly from a normal expansion year.
Research attempting to identify the determinants of growth during the early stages of a
recovery thus has the potential to reveal factors that might influence the international
divergence of incomes. We contribute to these efforts by presenting evidence on the link
between exchange rate policy and the growth rate of output over the first few years of a
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recovery.
The link between exchange rate flexibility, the international balance sheet and economic
recoveries is analysed in this paper through the application of OLS and two-stage least
squares estimators to a sample of 201 recovery episodes over the timeframe running
from 1971 to 2007. This sample covers 55 countries spread over the upper and middle
income classifications of the World Bank income groupings. Exchange rate flexibility is
measured using the de facto exchange rate regime coding system introduced by Klein
and Shambaugh (2008). Changes in the history of regime choice in the years immediately
before the recovery are used to capture exogenous variation in exchange rate flexibility
in the two-stage least squares procedure. The impact of this exogenous variation in
exchange rate flexibility on recoveries is estimated for specific characterisations of the
international balance sheet. Several measures of the international balance sheet are
employed. Debt assets and liabilities are used initially, and then net foreign assets is
considered. Measures capturing the foreign currency denominated components of the
international balance sheet are the main focus of the estimations.
Our results indicate that when foreign currency denominated debt liabilities are relatively
high, a pegged regime is associated with significantly faster growth (of real GDP per
capita) than a non-pegged regime in the first two years of the recovery. This disparity
is both economically and statistically significant. For instance, the estimations indicate
that a country with both net foreign currency denominated debt at the 39th percentile
level (foreign currency denominated assets less foreign currency liabilities equals -34
percent of GDP) and a pegged regime experiences a recovery that proceeds 1.1 percentage
points faster than that achieved under a non-pegged arrangement in the first post-
recession year. Since the average one-year recovery growth rate in the sample is 3.4
percent, the growth boost under a peg is economically large. Put differently, the results
suggest that when foreign currency denominated indebtedness becomes sufficiently large
the adverse balance sheet effects associated with higher levels of exchange rate flexibility
begin to significantly outweigh the expenditure switching effects. Diagnostic testing
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supports the validity of the IV estimations. Moreover, the estimations are robust to
changes in the set of conditioning variables and the use of alternative measures of foreign
currency debt.
When considering total debt liabilities (i.e. the foreign and domestic currency denomi-
nated components) the nature of the relationship is similar but the degree of statistical
precision is weaker. Furthermore, the link between regime choice and recoveries does
not appear to be conditional on broader balance sheet measures encapsulating total as-
sets and total liabilities. Thus, our analysis suggests the balance sheet effects stemming
from foreign currency debt exposure are most relevant to the link between exchange rate
flexibility and recoveries.
Theory Literature There have been considerable efforts in the theoretical literature
to understand the shock absorbing capacity of different exchange rate regimes. Friedman
(1953) emphasised that the substitutability between exchange rate flexibility and internal
price flexibility enables variation in the exchange rate to act as a means of speeding up
adjustment to and hence recovery from country specific real shocks in the presence
of internal price rigidities. Consequently, a peg would be less proficient at absorbing
adverse shocks than a more flexible exchange rate system. The sentiments of Friedman
were echoed in the work of Mundell (1968) and Fleming (1962). An extended version
of the Mundell-Fleming model introduced by Eichengreen and Sachs (1986) postulated
that exchange rate flexibility serves to overcome the constraint imposed by nominal wage
rigidity on the adjustment process following a real shock. Specifically, the expenditure
switching (from foreign to domestic goods) prompted by an exchange rate devaluation
leads to an increase in domestic prices which lowers real wages and in turn, boosts
aggregate supply. Ultimately, devaluation is presented as a route to recovery in the
aftermath of an adverse shock. More recent work by Broda (2004) and Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe (2011) also assert that nominal exchange rate flexibility is a tool for coping
with adverse real disturbances when there are nominal wage rigidities.
While these theories are compelling there is reason to suspect they provide an incomplete
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insight into the shock-absorbing capabilities of different exchange rate regimes since the
implications of changes in the exchange rate extend beyond expenditure switching ef-
fects. In the financial accelerator mechanism proposed by Bernanke and Gertler (1989),
changes in borrower net worth affect the agency costs of investment, and in turn, this
change in the cost of finance influences investment and output. Alternatively, under the
accelerator mechanism of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), changes in the value of collat-
eralisable assets affect borrowing capacity, and in turn, investment and output. Since
changes in the exchange rate impact the valuation of foreign currency denominated assets
and liabilities, either financial accelerator mechanism gives rise to an additional channel
through which exchange rate flexibility can influence an economy’s response to a shock.
In the presence of an accelerator mechanism, output will be influenced by changes in the
value of asset and liability positions stemming from movements in the exchange rate.
Therefore, the extent to which an adverse real shock can be overcome through variation
in the exchange rate depends on the sum of the expenditure switching and balance sheet
effects resulting from an exchange rate depreciation (or devaluation).
There is disagreement in the theoretical literature over the impact of exchange rate
movements when these balance sheet effects are taken into account. This literature
typically adopts a dynamic general equilibrium model of a small open economy popu-
lated by rational agents and subject to nominal rigidities. In addition, capital flows are
unrestricted and some form of uncovered interest parity condition is assumed to hold.
Consequently, monetary autonomy is foregone under a fixed exchange rate arrangement
in these models.
Comments by Cook (2004), Curdia (2008) and Towbin and Weber (2011) attribute the
lack of consensus when balance sheet effects enter the discussion to differences in two
assumptions. The first difference is whether nominal rigidities are assumed to be present
in retail prices or wages, while the second distinction concerns the assumed degree of
separation between the agents engaged in borrowing and the agents directly impacted
by the nominal price rigidities (i.e. whether the price of borrowers’ output is directly
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subject to nominal rigidities).
Cook (2004) shows that fixed exchange rates are superior to flexible following an adverse
shock to the world interest rate when assuming that wages are competitively determined,
retail prices are sticky and the entities engaged in foreign currency denominated bor-
rowing are effectively joined with the distributing firms that directly face the nominal
rigidities. The expenditure switching effect is counteracted by the balance sheet effect
under the flexible exchange rate regime to such an extent that a pegged regime is asso-
ciated with less post-shock instability. Choi and Cook (2004) also suggest that pegs are
more stabilising though in their framework all foreign currency denominated borrowing
is undertaken by domestic banks. The decline in aggregate bank net worth following an
exchange rate depreciation leads to an increase in the country risk premium which leads
to further exchange rate depreciation. Thus, the initial balance sheet effect initiates a
feedback loop between the country risk premium and currency depreciation and as a
result, the decline in output following a shock to the world interest rate under a flexible
regime exceeds the contraction under a peg.
In contrast to these predictions, a flexible regime was shown to be a better shock ab-
sorber than a peg by Cespedes, Chang and Velasco (2004) which assumed that wages are
sticky, retail prices are competitively determined and the firms engaged in foreign cur-
rency denominated borrowing are directly exposed to the nominal wage rigidity. Thus,
changing from retail price stickiness to wage rigidity affects the ranking of regimes. A
flexible regime was also a better insulator than a peg in the models presented by Gertler,
Gilchrist and Natalucci (2003) and Curdia (2008) which both assumed that retail prices
are sticky, wages are competitively determined and the firms borrowing in a foreign
currency are separate from the firms directly impacted by the nominal rigidities. Fur-
thermore, Devereux, Lane and Xu (2006) showed that a flexible exchange rate regime
remains more stabilising than a peg in a model incorporating balance sheet effects even
when the expenditure switching effect was limited by a model setup featuring low ex-
change rate pass-through into imported goods prices.
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So far we have considered models that incorporate balance sheet effects by way of a
Bernanke and Gertler (1989) style financial accelerator. In a small open economy model
featuring nominal wage rigidities, Fornaro (2015) introduces a collateral constraint along
the lines of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and finds that an exchange rate peg is a less
proficient shock absorber than more flexible exchange rate arrangements.
Despite the conflict between the models discussed here, the theory literature does clearly
suggest that both balance sheet and expenditure switching effects are important re-
sponses to exchange rate movements. It is just the relative magnitude of these effects
that differs between models. On the one hand, the sensitivity of the predictions to
changes in some contentious assumptions indicates that the role of exchange rate regimes
in economic recoveries should first be assessed empirically, as will be done in this paper.
That said, by highlighting two important responses to exchange rate movements, the
theoretical literature does provide guidance on the mechanisms that must be reflected in
our empirical model. More specifically, the theory models suggest that greater exchange
rate flexibility entails both expenditure switching and balance sheet effects. The size
of the balance sheet effects will depend on the level of foreign currency denominated
borrowing. Therefore, the empirical model adopted in this study will assess the impact
of different exchange rate regimes on economic recoveries at specific levels of foreign
currency denominated debt.
Empirical Literature Moving to the empirics, the account of economic policy dur-
ing the Great Depression presented by Eichengreen (1992) indicates that departure from
the Gold Standard facilitated recovery during the 1930s. Similarly, Eichengreen and
Sachs (1985) suggest that increased exchange rate flexibility, in the form of currency de-
valuation, facilitated recovery during the Great Depression in their study of 10 countries
over the time period extending from 1929 to 1935. More specifically, they found that
those countries which devalued their currencies sooner achieved a significantly higher
level of industrial output by 1935 than the countries which were late to devalue or chose
to leave their exchange rates unchanged through 1935. The devaluation was associated
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with significant improvements in exports and the incentive to invest (the demand side)
along with a material decrease in the real wage rate (the supply side). These supply
side effects were the subject of a more detailed examination by Bernanke and Carey
(1996) in their study of a larger panel of 22 countries over the eight years ending in
1936. Relying on each country’s choice of exchange rate policy (abandoned the Gold
Standard or remained on gold) as a means of identification, their study presents evidence
of a significant inverse link between real wages and output, as well as an upward sloping
aggregate supply curve. The authors contend that these results support the view that
price changes impact output through their effect on real wages, thus providing an indi-
cation that the combination of sticky wages and the adverse demand shocks experienced
by adherents to the Gold Standard were the source of the prolonged period of depressed
output during the sample period. This finding along with the work of Eichengreen and
Sachs suggests that relatively flexible exchange rate arrangements can help overcome
the problem of nominal rigidities and in turn, aid an economy in its recovery from a
recession.
Additional stylised evidence substantiating the claim that floating exchange rates are as-
sociated with more rapid recoveries than pegged regimes is presented by Cerra, Panizza
and Saxena (2009) which analysed a panel of 142 countries over the period from 1974
to 2004. In this study the magnitude of the growth advantage was both economically
and statistically significant with floats being associated with an increase in growth of
about one percentage point compared to a peg during the first recovery year. Compa-
rable findings were obtained in research on the aftermath of economic crises. Guidotti,
Sturzenegger and Villar (2005) suggest that floating exchange rates appeared to be su-
perior to fixed regimes during recoveries from sudden stop crises occurring between 1975
and 2002. The statistically significant cumulative growth gain from adopting a float
(rather than less flexible arrangements) after each of the first three post-crisis years was
4.2, 8.5 and 5.5 percentage points respectively. Similarly, Tsangarides (2012) found that
increased exchange rate flexibility was beneficial for emerging market countries during
the recovery from the 2008-2009 financial crisis. Even when allowing for interactions
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between short term external debt and the exchange rate regime, more flexible arrange-
ments were found to be universally superior. Specifically, the results suggest that pegged
regimes recovered from the crisis at a rate that was approximately 1.5 to 2 percentage
points slower than under more flexible arrangements.
Further insight is provided by the empirical literature on the shock absorbing capacity
of different types of exchange rate regime. Broda (2002) found that fixed exchange rates
fared significantly worse than floating in this regard. With a float, an adverse terms
of trade shock was associated with both a significant real exchange rate depreciation
and a negligible change in GDP. A significant decline in GDP accompanied such a
shock under a peg since the real exchange rate was unable to adjust by an adequate
amount. However, this significant disparity in GDP performance was not apparent in
highly dollarized economies and therefore, the results provide an additional hint that the
balance sheet effects, which feature so prominently in the theoretical literature, may be
an important factor in ranking alternative exchange rate regimes. Indeed, Towbin and
Weber (2012) found the shock absorbing capacity of flexible exchange rates to be better
than that of fixed exchange rates when external debt is relatively low but not when it is
relatively high. Moreover, the same study also suggests import structure (as measured
by the proportion of imports accounted for by raw materials) impacts the insulating
capacity of floating exchange rates. That is, when raw materials comprised a large share
of imports, a float appeared to outperform a peg in the face of an adverse shock, while
at low levels of raw materials imports a peg was superior to a float.
It is apparent that the empirical literature on the subject at hand is in the midst of
progressing from a consensus view that greater exchange rate flexibility is better in
general during the rebound from a recession to a realisation that perhaps the optimal
exchange rate regime for the recovery process depends on the international balance sheet
of the country concerned. However, this advance is far from complete since the existing
empirical work exhibits several weaknesses, thus signalling the potential for additional
contributions to the field.
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Firstly, it is possible to improve on the method of exchange rate regime classification
adopted in the aforementioned empirical work. Several of the papers used the IMF de
jure classification system, which as its name suggests, is based on individual countrys’
reports to the IMF regarding the exchange rate regime they have adopted. The reliability
of this approach was questioned by Calvo and Reinhart (2002), which presented evidence
indicating that a number of countries with IMF de jure floats actually have an exchange
rate that behaves in a manner consistent with a peg classification. Therefore, the study
by Towbin and Weber (2011) which uses the IMF de jure classifications may well have
obtained unreliable inferences since the exchange rate flexibility indicated by an IMF de
jure float may in reality be non-existent.
A number of de facto regime classification systems have been put forward to address
this weakness of the IMF de jure coding scheme. Some of the studies described above
used the de facto coding scheme introduced by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003),
which classifies exchange rate arrangements according to exchange rate movement and
the variability of international reserves. This approach was criticised by Tavlas, Dellas
and Stockman (2008) on the grounds that data on reserves can be ‘highly unreliable’
[p949] since governments are able to exert influence over their exchange rate by means
that are not reflected in this reserve data, while at the same time, reserves can change
for reasons unrelated to government efforts to control exchange rates. In particular,
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) note that authorities in numerous countries influence their
exchange rate by trading dollar linked domestic debt while others engage in transactions
in the forward market or use interest rate policy rather than direct market intervention.
Moreover, Bubula and Otker-Robe (2002) mention that reserve data may be mislead-
ing due to distortions caused by valuation changes, and what’s more, they also assert
that simultaneous intervention by another country may lead to a given country’s reserve
changes being ineffective. These criticisms suggest that the results from the studies rely-
ing on the Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) system (Cerra et al. (2009), Towbin and
Weber (2011), Broda (2004), and Guidotti et al. (2004)) should be treated with caution.
The IMF de facto codings used by Tsangarides (2012) also use data on reserves in the
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classification process, and thus, the results of that study may also have been adversely
effected. At the same time, Tavlas et al. (2008) argues that the IMF de facto approach
may suffer from a lack of consistency across countries since the subjective judgement of
numerous IMF economists forms part of the classification process. Consequently, dispar-
ities between these economists’ views regarding the precise characteristics of a particular
exchange rate regime may lead to a given country’s classification depending on which
analyst determines its coding. Finally, the study by Broda (2004) uses the classfication
scheme introduced by Ghosh, Gulde, Ostry and Wolf (1997), which is a combination of
both de facto and de jure approaches to regime coding. However, a pegged regime that
undergoes a one-time change in parity (in a give year) remains a peg under this approach
and as a result, the coding scheme may not identify all exchange rate movements that
give rise to balance sheet and expenditure switching effects. This deficiency along with
those mentioned before indicate that a study using a coding scheme that overcomes these
weaknesses, such as the Klein and Shambaugh (2008) system that is used in the present
paper, would offer a new insight.
With the exception of the studies investigating the shock absorbing capacity of different
exchange rate regimes, there is room to improve on the existing work examining the
interactions between external indebtedness and exchange rate flexibility in the recovery
process. Moreover, even in the studies considering these interactions, the focus does not
extend beyond foreign currency debt to more expansive balance sheet measures such as
net foreign assets. That being the case, the present paper, which incorporates broader
balance sheet metrics in addition to a more comprehensive analysis of the interactions
between external debt and exchange rate flexibility, offers an opportunity to obtain a
more thorough understanding of the valuation channels that are so heavily emphasised
in the theoretical literature.
This paper is organised as follows. We describe our data and methodology in sections





The data is comprised of 201 recovery episodes spread across 55 countries over the time
period extending from 1971 to 2007.1 While the sample was selected on the basis of data
availability, the resulting distribution of income levels (according to the World Bank
income groupings) was relatively even with 27 countries being classified as high income
and 28 as middle income (13 upper middle income and 15 lower middle income).
The business cycle dating algorithm introduced by Morsink, Helbling and Tokarick
(2002) was applied to the annual real GDP per capita series from the Penn World
Tables to identify recovery episodes. A given year was classified as a trough if growth
in that year was negative and growth in the subsequent year was positive. Similarly,
a peak occurred in a year of positive growth that was followed by a year of negative
growth. The recoveries took place in the year(s) immediately following a trough. While
the use of higher frequency data would have enabled the cycle turning point to be more
accurately located, data availability precluded such an approach.
The speed of recovery will be measured using the growth rate of real GDP per capita
during the recovery. Although recoveries can also be gauged by the time taken for
output to return to the peak achieved before the recession began, that measure will not
be used here since its distribution in the sample is poorly suited to regression analysis.
Approximately 53 percent of recoveries in the sample regain peak output one year after
the trough and consequently, a substantial proportion of the observations exhibit no
variation in the variable we are attempting to explain, and as a result, cross-section
analysis would be problematic. That said, about 83 percent of sample recoveries regain
peak output within three years of the trough and thus, the decision to analyse output
growth over the first three years of the recovery implies that our investigation captures
the timeframe in which a large majority of the observations in the sample return to peak
1A list of the countries is shown in the Appendix in Section 3.6.
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output.
A number of data points were excluded from the sample. Firstly, observations with
inflation above 40 percent per annum were removed as Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) sug-
gest that the link between exchange rate arrangements and macroeconomic performance
begins to breakdown when inflation exceeds this threshold. Secondly, observations with
growth of real GDP per capita in the 99th percentile in the first year of the recovery
were excluded to avoid the misleading influence that such extreme values may have on
the analysis. Thirdly, the developmental level of low income countries was deemed to
be insufficient for them to possess a credit allocation mechanism of adequate sophistica-
tion for the financial accelerator mechanism to operate, and as a result, one low income
country was excluded from the sample. Fourthly, the US was excluded from the sample
since the theory models guiding our empirical analysis focus on small open economies.
Finally, observations with values of the net foreign currency debt measure in the 1st and
99th percentiles were also excluded.
The main variables of interest (a measure of exchange rate flexibility and gauges of exter-
nal indebtedness) are described in sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3. Additional covariates include
the amplitude of the recession preceding the recovery, the (log) change in government
expenditure, banking and currency crisis dummies, trade and capital account openness
measures, the (log) change in the terms of trade, the (log) change in global world exports
(i.e. the change in the sum of exports by all countries in the world), the change in the
real interest rate, and the change in a political regime index. Detailed definitions of
these controls are provided in Appendix B.
3.1.2 Measuring Exchange Rate Flexibility
The de facto exchange rate regime classification was calculated in accordance with the
coding scheme introduced by Klein and Shambaugh (2008). In this approach a country-
year observation is designated as a peg if the monthly nominal exchange rate (against
an appropriate base currency) remains within a ±2 percent band for the entire year.
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Exchange rate movements falling outside this band are coded as non-peg. The nomi-
nal exchange rate data used in this process was obtained from the IMF International
Financial Statistics database.
A potential concern when using the Klein-Shambaugh measure is whether the band
width captures a degree of exchange rate flexibility that is appropriate for the subject of
this paper. Klein and Shambaugh address this possibility by noting that the band they
recommend is very similar to the requirements placed on historical pegs such as the gold
points in the Gold Standard and the bands in Bretton Woods and the EMS. Moreover,
assuming the inaccuracy in the choice of band width represents classical measurement
error, the instrumental variables technique used in this study should ensure that failure
to select the ideal band size will not bias the results.
Since there are three prominent regime classification systems other than the approach
chosen here, the grounds for selecting the Klein-Shambaugh scheme will now be ex-
plained. The most prominent de facto coding systems were introduced by Levy-Yeyati
and Sturzenegger (2003), Shambaugh (2004) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2004).
The Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger method was not selected due to its use of potentially
misleading international reserves data in the classification process.2 In contrast, the
Klein-Shambaugh method focuses purely on exchange rate movements and is thus not
affected by reserves data. It should be noted that using only exchange rate data can
lead to instances where a peg classification is attained simply due to a lack of shocks
in the foreign exchange market rather than intervention by the monetary authorities.
That said, Klein and Shambaugh estimate the probability of such an outcome under
some classic floats (USD-DM, USD-JPY, USD-AUD) to be extremely low (less than 1
percent) and therefore, the Klein-Shambuagh scheme should reflect the true intentions
of policy for the vast majority of observations.
Furthermore, the Shambaugh and Reinhart-Rogoff systems were deemed to be inap-
2Our review of the empirical literature in the introduction discusses the shortcomings of international
reserve data.
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propriate as they both failed to exhibit a sufficient degree of sensitivity to short run
movements in the exchange rate. In the theory models relevant to the subject at hand,
a one-off exchange rate devaluation leads to balance sheet and expenditure switching
effects, the combination of which has implications for output growth. Consequently, a
regime coding scheme that does not provide an indication of when such devaluations
take place is not suited to this study. In the Shambaugh (2004) method a given year
is classified as a peg if the behaviour of the nominal exchange rate falls into one of two
categories: (i) the nominal exchange rate remains within a ±2 percent band for the
entire year; (ii) in 11 out of 12 months in the year there is no change in the exchange
rate but in the remaining month there is a movement in the exchange rate of any size.
If neither of these conditions is satisfied then the classification is non-peg. Thus, it is
apparent that the Shambaugh method fails to bring one-off devaluations to light. In
the Reinhart-Rogoff approach, a peg classification is applied when the probability that
the absolute monthly change in the nominal exchange rate remains within a one percent
band over a rolling five-year window is greater than or equal to 80 percent. Consequently,
a one-time devaluation beyond the one percent band may not be lead to a change in the
Reinhart-Rogoff classification. Since the Klein-Shambaugh classification changes from
peg to non-peg when a one-time devaluation moves the exchange rate outside of the ±2
percent band, the problem of insensitivity to short-run exchange rate movements is not
a feature of that approach.
3.1.3 Measuring the International Balance Sheet
Each of the following metrics play a role in our analysis of the balance sheet effects
generated by exchange rate movements. The first measure of each countrys’ international
balance sheet captures overall external debt exposure and is defined as,
Net Debti,r =
Debt Assetsi,r −Debt Liabilitiesi,r
GDPi,r
(3.1)
This debt measure and all that follow are measured as at the end of the recession
preceding recovery r for country i. GDP in (3.1) is smoothed using a HP filter (with the
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smoothing coefficient set to 100) to reduce the variability not emanating from changes
in debt liabilities or debt assets.
The numerator in (3.1) is comprised of external debt liabilities and debt assets de-
nominated in both domestic and foreign currencies. Net foreign currency denominated
debt will be gauged through multiplying debt assets and liabilities by factors produced
by Lane and Shambaugh (2010), which reflect the proportion of debt assets and lia-
bilities denominated in a foreign currency. Another variable prepared by Eichengreen,
Hausmann and Panizza (2003) named the Original Sin index (OSIN) also measures the
proportion of debt denominated in foreign currency but only for the liability side of
the external balance sheet.3 Unfortunately, neither of these datasets cover the complete
timeframe being used in the present study (the OSIN data runs from 1993 to 2001 while
the Lane-Shambaugh data runs from 1990 to 2004). Eichengreen et al. (2003) present
evidence indicating that the OSIN measure has been relatively stable since the 1850s
and hence it appears reasonable to use the country average of either of the OSIN or
Lane-Shambaugh factors to capture the foreign currency component of external debt.
The only exception to this use of country averages of the Lane-Shambaugh factor is for
recovery episodes in countries that were members of the European Single Currency and
had introduced the Euro, where we use the average of the Lane-Shambaugh factors for
the years after the introduction of the Euro in the respective country. The application
of the Lane-Shambaugh factors to (3.1) gives,
Net Foreign Currency Debti,r =
Debt Assetsi,r ∗DAFCi −Debt Liabilitiesi,r ∗DLFCi
GDPi,r
(3.2)
where DAFCi and DLFCi equal the proportion of assets and liabilities (respectively)
denominated in a foreign currency for country i.
Robustness will be assessed through the use of alternative balance sheet measures in
which debt exposure is normalised using gross debt. The first of these alternative mea-
sures captures total debt liabilities (denominated in both foreign and domestic curren-
3This OSIN index will not be used in the net foreign currency denominated debt measure but will
instead be used in the debt liability dollarization measure described below.
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cies) and is defined as,
All Currency Debt Liabilitiesi,r =
Debt Liabilitiesi,r
Debt Liabilitiesi,r +Debt Assetsi,r
(3.3)
The foreign currency component of (3.3) is isolated in the debt liability dollarization
measure which is defined as follows,
Debt Liability Dollarizationi,r =
Debt Liabilitiesi,r ∗DLFCi
Debt Liabilitiesi,r +Debt Assetsi,r
(3.4)
where DLFC is the proportion of debt liabilities denominated in a foreign currency in
country i.4 An additional test of robustness will be conducted through the use of two
separate debt liability dollarization measures, one calculated with the OSIN factors, the
other prepared with the Lane-Shambaugh factors.
Broader measures of the international balance sheet will also be used. The definition of
these variables follow those described above with debt assets and debt liabilities being
replaced by total assets and total liabilities respectively. The factors measuring the
foreign currency component of these broader balance sheet metrics are all obtained from
the Lane-Shambaugh dataset as the OSIN measure only applies to debt and not total
assets or total liabilities. The first of these broader measures is net foreign currency
assets and is defined as,
Net Foreign Currency Assetsi,r =
Total Assetsi,r ∗ TAFCi − Total Liabilitiesi,r ∗ TLFCi
GDPi,r
(3.5)
where TAFC and TLFC equal the proportion of total assets and total liabilities (re-
spectively) denominated in a foreign currency. The second of the broader balance sheet
measures is,
Total Liability Dollarizationi,r =
Total Liabilitiesi,r ∗ TLFCi
Total Assetsi,r +Total Liabilitiesi,r
(3.6)
All asset and liability variables used in measuring the international balance sheet were
obtained from the External Wealth of Nations (EWN) dataset produced by Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2004). Definitions of the asset and liability variables are given in the
Appendix in Section 3.7.
4This approach to measuring debt liability dollarization was based on Berkman and Cavallo (2007).
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3.1.4 Descriptive Statistics
Summary statistics for the main variables of interest are presented in Table 3.1. Sum-
mary statistics for the remaining variables are provided in the Appendix in Section
3.8.
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Median St Dev Max Min
drgdpc 0.034 0.026 0.028 0.169 0.0001
d2rgdpc 0.057 0.051 0.051 0.299 -0.0768
d3rgdpc 0.079 0.071 0.064 0.281 -0.1720
Klein-Shambaugh regime classification 0.672 1.000 0.471 1.000 0
Regime Record 1.940 2.000 1.838 5.000 0
Net foreign currency debt -0.311 -0.283 0.260 0.387 -1.498
Net debt -0.324 -0.298 0.256 0.370 -1.498
DLD (using Lane-Shambaugh index) 0.716 0.769 0.202 0.984 0.141
All currency debt liabilities 0.754 0.786 0.155 0.984 0.264
Net foreign currency assets -0.120 -0.142 0.421 3.140 -1.484
Net foreign assets -0.373 -0.356 0.371 1.346 -1.777
Number of observations is 201. drgdpc, d2rgdpc and d3rgdpc measure the (log) growth of real GDP per
capita over one-, two- and three-year recovery periods respectively. DLD=debt liability dollarization.
3.2 Methodology
3.2.1 Empirical Model
The following relationship will be estimated to test the predictions of the theoretical
literature.
gi,r = α+ γ1KSi,r + γ2EDi,r + γ3KSi,r ∗ EDi,r + δAMPi,r + β
′Zi,r + εi,r (3.7)
where gi,r is the (log) growth of real GDP per capita for country i during recovery
r; KSi,r is the Klein-Shambaugh measure of exchange rate flexibility over recovery r;
EDi,r is the level of external indebtedness at the end of the final year of the recession
preceding recovery r; AMPi,r is the amplitude of the recession preceding recovery r;
Zi,r is a vector of control variables detailed in section 3.2.3; and εi,r is an error term.
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External debt is measured at the end of the recession preceding recovery r to restrict
potential endogeneity problems.
Separate estimations of (7) will be conducted for one, two and three year recovery
periods. In the two and three year models, the measure of exchange rate flexibility will
be the average of the annual exchange rate regime classifications while external debt will
continue to be measured at the end of the recession preceding recovery r.
The estimated values of γ1 and γ3 offer some insight into the effect of increased exchange
rate flexibility on recovery growth at specific levels of external indebtedness. That is, the
model specification weighs the ability of a non-pegged regime to overcome the problems
stemming from nominal rigidities against the impact of increased exchange rate flexibility
on a country’s international balance sheet, and in so doing, will evaluate the expenditure
switching and balance sheet effects suggested in the theoretical literature. Furthermore,
depending on the signs of γ1 and γ3, the quotient γ1/γ3 may indicate whether a threshold
exists at which the direction of the effect of increased exchange rate flexibility on recovery
growth changes.
Recession amplitude (AMP ) is included to address the threat to identification stemming
from the possible link between recession depth and both exchange rate regime choice
during the recession and recovery growth. Evidence presented by Klein and Shambaugh
(2008), which is discussed in more detail in section 3.2.2, indicates that regime choice
before the recovery begins is associated with regime choice during the recovery. At
the same time, the theory model presented by Fornaro (2015) gives reason to suspect
that exchange rate regime choice will influence the depth of a recession. Moreover, the
‘Plucking Model’ of Friedman (1988) and the empirical work of Claessens, Kose and
Terrones (2011) both suggest the existence of a positive relationship between recession
amplitude and recovery growth. In sum, these associations suggest that a failure to
control for recession amplitude would lead to omitted variable bias since it is plausible
that recession amplitude is associated with both regime choice during the recovery and
recovery growth.
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Initially (3.7) will be estimated using OLS. The results from these initial estimations
should be treated with caution for two reasons. Firstly, the Klein-Shambaugh measure
is affected by policy choices which themselves could well have been influenced by the
speed of the recovery. Hence, reverse causality presents a plausible threat to identifi-
cation when using OLS to estimate (3.7). Furthermore, identification of (3.7) relies on
the assumption that the measure of exchange rate flexibility is an accurate gauge of the
‘true’ exchange rate regime in the context of this study. De facto exchange rate regime
classification is a controversial issue and thus, although the chosen method appears supe-
rior to other available coding systems for the purposes of this study, it is still conceivable
that the Klein-Shambaugh approach may not completely capture the variation in the
exchange rate that is most relevant for the estimation of (3.7). In other words, there
may be measurement error in the exchange rate flexibility metric and consequently, OLS
estimation of (3.7) could be biased. These two threats to identification will be addressed
using an instrumental variables estimation strategy.
3.2.2 Identification Strategy
The objective when selecting an instrument was to choose a variable that captures the
recent history of a country’s exchange rate policy. The chosen instrument (‘regime
record’) equals the number of years that a country had a pegged regime (according to
the Klein-Shambaugh system) during the five years immediately preceding the recovery.
This variable follows the structure of the instrument used by Razin and Rubinstein
(2005) but we provide a different justification for instrument relevance.
Loosely speaking, the history encapsulated by the regime record indicates whether a
country had a predilection for a particular regime type in the years leading up to the
recovery. Thus, identification relies upon this proximate history being able to explain
regime choice during the recovery. Evidence regarding the dynamics of exchange rate
regime choice presented by Klein and Shambaugh (2008) can be used to more rigorously
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justify the relevance of this instrument.5 The estimations of Klein and Shambaugh
suggest a survival result which indicates that as the number of years spent in a particular
regime increases so does the probability of remaining within that regime for another year.
More specifically, the probability of maintaining a one-year old peg for another year was
estimated to be 55.9 percent whereas the probability of a five-year old peg lasting another
year was 87.7 percent. Similar probabilities were estimated for non-pegged arrangments.
In addition to this finding, the study also identified a switching result which indicates
that as the time spent in a particular regime increases, the amount of time spent in the
subsequent regime decreases. What’s more, a relatively short-lived regime was typically
followed by a longer time spell in the succeeding regime.
A regime record equal to zero or five indicates that the same regime has been in place for
at least five consecutive years and consequently, according to the Klein and Shamabugh
survival result there is a high probability that the regime will be in place for another
year for such values of the instrument. While this regime persistence could be captured
by two dummy variables indicating whether the regime choice for all five years before
the recovery was either a float or peg, such an approach would not capture the useful
predictive capacity of instances where regime record equals values other than zero or
five. This extra variation is particularly informative when regime record equals one.
That is, one year out of the five years in the regime record is a peg and the remaining
four years are non-pegged. The possible combinations of peg (P) and non-peg (F) over
the five-year period with this regime record are,
(a)PFFFF; (b) FPFFF;(c) FFPFF; (d) FFFPF; (e) FFFFP
In combination (a) there is a period of four consecutive non-pegged years immediately
prior to the recovery, which indicates a relatively high probability of another year in
a peg based on the Klein and Shamabugh survival result. Arrays (b), (c), and (d)
represent instances of relatively short peg spells. Based on the switching result it would
5This evidence is based on estimations using the same Klein-Shambaugh coding scheme used here.
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be reasonable to expect a relatively long non-pegged spell to follow these solitary peg
years. Consequently, the switching property suggests that combinations (b), (c), and (d)
exhibit characteristics that are supportive of the proposition that there will be a non-peg
in the first year of the recovery. Moreover, the survival result also supports the view that
there will be a non-peg in the first year of recovery after regime records (b) and (c) since
each of these combinations has more than one non-pegged year just before the recovery.
Finally, in combination (e) a non-pegged spell of at least four years in length precedes a
single pegged year. Klein and Shambugh estimate the proportion of non-pegged spells
lasting at least 4 years is about 38 percent and, as a result, it is reasonable to infer that
this non-pegged spell is relatively long and, in turn, the switching result suggests that
the subsequent pegged spell will be relatively short. While this prediction from array (e)
is less helpful in guiding expectations, the other four combinations when regime record
equals one provide evidence in favour of a non-peg in the first year of the recovery and
thus, a regime record of one is useful in forecasting regime choice.
A simple comparison of the distribution of exchange rate regimes during the first year
of the recovery at each level of regime record provides further evidence supporting the
assertions of instrument relevance. Table 3.2 contains the average regime choice during
the recovery for each value of regime record. There is a very strong association between
regime records equal to zero or five and the decision to adopt a non-pegged or pegged
regime (respectively) during the first post-recession year. Also, a regime record of one
is strongly associated with a float in the recovery year. At the same time, with the
exception of the change between regime records equal to one and two, the average regime
choice follows a reasonably steady downward path as regime record increases from zero
to five. While these observations do suggest instrument relevance they should be treated
with caution when viewed in isolation since they are not conditioned upon other variables
influencing regime choice. However, the main analysis in section 3.3 comprehensively
addresses this issue of instrument strength and ultimately, the diagnostics do not suggest
that the regime record instrument is weak (i.e. the inferences we made on the basis of
Table 3.2 are sound).
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Table 3.2: Regime Distribution
Average Klein-Shambaugh Classification During Recovery
Regime Record 1-year 2-year 3-year
0 0.909 0.900 0.901
1 0.765 0.750 0.775
2 0.793 0.776 0.736
3 0.650 0.700 0.700
4 0.409 0.455 0.424
5 0.133 0.155 0.179
Note: Under the Klein-Shambaugh classification system, 1=non-peg and 0=peg. Regime record equals
the number of years that a country had a pegged regime - according to the Klein-Shambaugh system -
during the five years immediately preceding the recovery.
The same regime record instrument will also be used in the estimations for the two and
three-year post recession periods. Table 3.2 also shows the two- and three-year post-
recession averages of the exchange rate regime classification for each value of regime
record. The stability of these averages over the multiyear recovery periods suggests
that the same instrument is relevant for explaining regime choice over the one, two and
three-year recovery horizons. This stability offers further support for the assertion that
variation in the regime record instrument provides a useful time-specific insight into
changes in a country’s preferred exchange rate regime. At the same time, the stability
also suggests persistence of regime choice once the recovery has begun.
The identification strategy also relies on the assumption that no variables omitted from
the empirical model are correlated with both regime record and speed of recovery. The
credence of possible threats to this exclusion restriction will be assessed in two ways.
The first involves a careful evaluation of the literature to pinpoint variables that have
been shown to influence both regime record (through their affect on exchange rate regime
choice) and growth during the recovery. Controlling for these variables in the empiri-
cal model provides a feasible yet imperfect means of ruling out threats to instrument
validity. The second approach to the assessment of instrument exogeneity will involve
the application of Hansen’s overidentifying restrictions test. Although the benchmark
model is not overidentified, it is possible to expand the number of instruments in a man-
ner consistent with the empirical evidence on regime durability, thereby permitting the
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use of the overidentifying restrictions test. The Klein and Shambaugh study and the
work of Husain, Mody and Rogoff (2005) suggests that while regime durability is evident
across all countries, the degree of persistence appears to vary with a country’s level of
development. This observation justifies the interaction of regime record with dummies
indicating a country’s World Bank income group. The number of instruments will then
exceed the number of endogenous variables and in turn, the overidentifying restrictions
test can be conducted.
Since the exchange rate regime is also part of an interaction term in (3.7), the model
contains two endogenous variables, and thus, at least two instruments are necessary for
identification of the benchmark model. The second instrument will be the interaction of
regime record and the external debt measure from the structural equation.
3.2.3 Control Variables
The choice of control variables was largely guided by the empirical work described in the
literature review along with the work of Cerra and Saxena (2005) on economic recoveries.
At the same time, controls were also selected so as to reduce the possibility that there
are omitted variables that are correlated with both speed of recovery and regime record.
The first control variable is the lagged (log) change in government consumption as a
percentage of GDP (∆Gov(-1)) and is intended to capture adjustments in fiscal policy
immediately before the recovery. The role of restrictions on capital inflows and outflows
in the recovery process is addressed by including the lagged value of the capital account
openness index (KAOpen(-1)) introduced by Chinn and Ito (2006) as a second control.
The third control is the lagged value of trade openness (TOpen(-1)), which equals the
sum of imports and exports as a percentage of GDP. Both capital account and trade
openness have been shown to be associated with recovery growth and exchange rate
regime choice (see for instance Levy-Yeyati, Sturzenegger and Reggio (2010) for evidence
on regime determination) and are thus particularly relevant in this study. Each of
these three controls is measured at the end of the recession immediately preceding each
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recovery to limit potential endogeneity problems.
As in Guidotti et al. (2004), two variables are included to control for shocks during the
recovery. The first of these is the (log) change in a terms of trade index (∆TT) while the
second is the (log) change in global world exports (∆Wex). The latter controls for time
specific common shocks in a manner that leads to the loss of fewer degrees of freedom
than the inclusion of time dummies. The change in the terms of trade index and the
growth in global world exports will be measured over the 1-, 2- or 3-year post-recession
time periods. The baseline model comprises the main variables of interest described
above in addition to the control variables detailed up to this point.
Furthermore, to distinguish between voluntary and forced variation in the choice of
exchange rate regime, a currency crisis dummy created by Laeven and Valencia (2008)
is also used as a control. This dummy indicates that a currency crisis has taken place
when there is a depreciation or devaluation of at least 30 percent in the nominal exchange
rate. At the same time, the decline in the value of the currency must also exceed the
previous year’s depreciation or devaluation by at least 10 percent. The movement in
the exchange rate during a currency crisis according to this definition is large enough to
move the nominal exchange rate outside of the ±2 percent band that separates pegged
from non-pegged regimes in the Klein-Shambaugh coding system. Due to the potential
endogeneity of the currency crisis, the correlation between crisis dummy and exchange
rate regime could potentially bias the coefficient estimates for the main variables of
interest in model specifications including the crisis indicator. To address this concern,
the model will be estimated with and without the crisis dummy to provide a more
reliable insight into the impact of controlling for the occurrence of a currency crisis
on the main associations being studied. In the multiyear estimations, the dummy will
indicate whether a currency crisis occurred at any time during the two or three-year
post-recession time periods.
The variables described thus far comprise the baseline model. Some additional variables
will also be used to test sensitivity to model specification changes and to further address
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the possibility that there are omitted variables that are correlated with both regime
record and recovery growth. The first addition will be the lagged change in the real
interest rate to control for variation in monetary policy during the recession, which could
be correlated with regime record. The second addition is a dummy for the occurrence
of a banking crisis during the recession preceding the recovery.6 Finally, the change in
the Polity IV political regime index prepared by the Center for Systemic Peace will also
be used. In addition to being linked with economic recoveries, the political regime has
also been linked with regime choice (see for instance Bernhard and Leblang (1999) and
Broz (2002)).
Another concern arises from the choice to only include the exchange rate regime in levels
throughout the estimations. This decision implies that the estimated regime coefficient
is an average of the impact of a switch in regime and the effect of leaving the regime
unchanged during the recovery year(s). As a result, the precise implications of the
estimated regime coefficient are unclear. The main concern here is that the impact
of increased exchange rate flexibility could be largely driven by the experience of the
regime switchers, in which case, an inference that increased exchange rate flexibility in
general is beneficial/harmful for the recovery (at a given level of external debt) would
be misleading. One way to address this issue would be to include the first difference
of the regime variable. However, the relatively small number of switches in the sample
combined with the lack of valid instruments for the change in the regime precluded this
strategy. As an alternative to this approach, the baseline specification is re-estimated
with the observations involving a switch in regime removed from the sample. This
strategy will provide an insight into the impact of increased exchange rate flexibility that
is not influenced by recoveries involving a change of exchange rate regime. Moreover,
changes in the regime point estimates between the full and reduced sample calculations
will offer some provisional guidance on the impact of switching the regime during the
recovery.
6The inclusion of the banking crisis dummy was prompted by the work of Abiad, Dell’Ariccia and Li
(2011).
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3.2.4 Further Features of the Estimation Process
The first stage of the two-stage least squares process for the exchange rate regime will
be estimated using a linear probability model. This contrasts with the empirical litera-
ture on the determinants of regime choice which typically uses a non-linear estimation
technique such as probit. While the underlying population first stage may in fact be
non-linear, Kelejian (1971) showed that the use of a linear first stage estimation tech-
nique under such circumstances still gives consistent estimates. Consequently, the IV
estimation process used here is theoretically consistent.
Nearly half of the countries in the sample have the same exchange rate regime in all their
recovery years and, as a result, the addition of country fixed effects to model (3.7) would
remove a significant proportion of the variation in the main variable of interest. As a
result, the ability of model (3.7) with country fixed effects to identify the relationship
of interest would be severely restricted. Therefore, country fixed effects will not be
employed in the baseline empirical model. However, omitting country dummies could
lead to autocorrelation in the error terms for each country since a control is not place for
potential fixed country specific factors that influence the recovery. To avoid the bias in
standard errors resulting from this potential serial correlation, the standard errors will be
clustered by country using a cluster method that is robust to arbitrary autocorrelation
and heteroskedasticity.7
The Angrist and Pischke (2009) first stage multivariate F-test of excluded instruments
will be used to address the possibility of weak identification in the two-stage least squares
estimations.8 The same test procedure is also applied to the other endogenous regressor
and, as a result, the estimated model has two first stage F-tests, one for each endogenous
7This approach draws on the modelling strategy adopted by Acemoglu et al (2003).
8In considering the possibility that the exchange rate regime variable is weakly identified, this F-test
begins by partialling out the part of the variation in the exchange rate regime that is explained by the
fitted values from the first stage regression for the other endogenous regressor (the interaction term).
Then the F-test assesses whether the residual remaining after partialling out the other endogenous
variable can be explained by the instruments. A failure of the instruments to exhibit such explanatory
power is a signal that the model could be weakly identified (i.e. the null of instrument irrelevance is not
rejected).
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variable. It should be emphasised that a failure to reject the null of instrument irrelevance
in this test is not a definitive indicator of instrument weakness and, as will be explained
in the results section below, further tests should be conducted to assess instrument
relevance when the F-test null is not rejected.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 First Stage Estimates
Table 3.3 shows the first stage estimates based on the net foreign currency debt (NFCD)
measure and two sets of conditioning variables. These estimates focus on the first year of
the recovery. Columns (1) and (2) contain the reduced form estimates for the exchange
rate regime while columns (3) and (4) display the first stage estimates for the interaction
term (KS x NFCD). In column (1) the overall association between regime record and
exchange rate regime has the expected negative sign while the magnitude of the point
estimate is reasonable given the distribution of exchange rate regimes at each level of
regime record in the sample in Table 3.2. Similarly, the estimates in column (3) also
conform with expectations and they imply an overall inverse link between regime record
and the exchange rate regime when NFCD is below the 83rd percentile level or above
zero. Specifications (2) and (4) suggest that the addition of a currency crisis dummy does
not lead to material changes in the first stage estimates. Furthermore, the Angrist and
Pischke multivariate F-test for excluded instruments does not give reason to suspect a
weak instrument problem since for each first stage specification this F-statistic is greater
than the rule of thumb critical value of ten (i.e. the null of instrument irrelevance is
rejected). Taken together, the estimates presented in Table 3.3 suggest the existence of
a sound first stage association between the excluded instruments and the endogenous
variables.
When using the alternative international balance sheet measures and the multi-year
recovery time periods, the first stage estimates are very similar to those discussed here.
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Table 3.3: First Stage Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
KS KS KS x NFCD KS x NFCD
Regime record -0.1378*** -0.1408*** -0.0127** -0.0112*
(0.0148) (0.0148) (0.0062) (0.0057)
Regime record x NFCD -0.0061 -0.0012 -0.1738*** -0.1763***
(0.0486) (0.0453) (0.0274) (0.0252)
Currency crisis dummy No Yes No Yes
Angrist-Pischke F-statistic 97.57 100.73 40.49 49.06
Dependent variable specified in column heading. Number of observations is 201 in columns (1)-(4). KS=Klein-
Shambaugh regime classification (1=non-peg, 0=peg) for 1-year recovery period. NFCD=Initial net foreign
currency debt. See Section 3.1.3 for definitions of external debt measure. *** and ** denote statistical significance
at the 1 and 5 percent levels respectively. Standard errors clustered by country shown in parentheses. The baseline
set of control variables is used throughout.
For that reason, the reduced form estimates for the remaining balance sheet metrics
will not be discussed in detail but the first stage diagnostics will still be included in our
second stage results tables.
3.3.2 External Debt: 1-year Horizon
Table 3.4 shows the estimates for the first year of the recovery under the NFCD measure,
which captures net foreign currency denominated debt assets as a proportion of (HP-
smoothed) GDP. The lower panel of this table contains the estimated partial derivative of
recovery growth with respect to the exchange rate regime for various levels of NFCD. The
OLS estimates in column (1) suggest that a pegged regime experiences faster recovery
growth than a non-pegged regime when net foreign currency debt is sufficiently low.9
Since the sample average growth rate during the first year of the recovery was 3.4 percent,
the point estimates for the exchange rate regime are of an economically meaningful
magnitude when NFCD is relatively low. Specifically, according to the OLS estimates
in column (1) the difference between recovery growth under pegged and non-pegged
regimes is 1 percentage point when NFCD equals -47 percent (25th percentile) and 1.4
percentage points when NFCD is -81 percent (5th percentile). The p-values for these
9Since NFCD equals net foreign currency denominated debt assets as a proportion of GDP, when net
foreign currency debt decreases there is a relatively higher level of foreign currency denominated debt
liabilities.
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differences are 3.2 percent at the 25th percentile of the debt measure and 6.8 percent at
the 5th percentile.
These OLS estimates may be biased due to reverse causality and/or measurement error.
The IV estimates in columns (2) through (5) of Table 3.4 seek to remedy these issues.
When using regime record as an instrument for exchange rate regime in column (2) the
general nature of the relationship is the same as that obtained with OLS. That is, pegged
regimes are associated with significantly faster recoveries than non-pegged arrangements
when NFCD is at or below the 49th percentile level (NFCD equals approximately -
29 percent). This growth difference is statistically significant with the p-values for the
exchange rate regime indicator being 5.7 percent at the 25th percentile of NFCD and 7.6
percent at the 5th percentile. At the same time, this growth disparity between regimes
is also economically significant with a peg being linked to a recovery growth rate that
is 1.6 percentage points faster than the rebound under a non-peg when NFCD is at the
25th percentile level and 1.9 percentage points faster at the 5th percentile. Thus, the
growth difference between exchange rate regimes was larger (in economic terms) in the
IV estimations, and consequently, there is an indication that that the OLS estimates
were biased toward zero. Similar results were obtained when the currency crisis dummy
was included in specification (3), thus providing a hint that the estimated effect of
increased exchange rate flexibility is likely to reflect a deliberate rather than forced
choice of exchange rate policy. Furthermore, as shown in column (4), when the number
of instruments was increased by interacting regime record with indicators for World Bank
income groups, the nature of the relationship between exchange rate regime and recovery
growth remains the same as in the prior estimations. Moreover, in this overidentified
model the p-values for the exchange rate regime indicator are 3.4 percent when NFCD
is at the 25th percentile level and 5.1 percent at the 5th percentile level.
The economic magnitude of the recovery growth difference between the two exchange
rate regimes remains relatively stable throughout the IV estimations. At the same time,
when NFCD is at the 45th, 25th and 5th percentile levels, the growth difference is
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Table 3.4: Exchange Rate Flexibility, Net Foreign Currency Debt and Recovery Growth
Dependent variable = 1-year (log) growth of real GDP per capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS LIML
KS -0.004 -0.012 -0.013 -0.012 -0.013
(0.006) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
KS x NFCD 0.012 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.010
(0.013) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018)
NFCD -0.010 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008
(0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
∆Gov(-1) 0.040 0.045 0.047 0.046 0.046
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
KAOpen(-1) -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.017***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
TOpen(-1) 0.00006** 0.00006** 0.00005* 0.00006** 0.00006**
(0.00002) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003)
∆Wex 0.040 0.033 0.029 0.032 0.032
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
∆TT 0.019 0.022 0.023 0.022 0.022
(0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022)
Recession Amplitude 0.030 0.036 0.044 0.036 0.037
(0.023) (0.023) (0.030) (0.024) (0.024)
Currency Crisis -0.021**
(0.009)
Intercept 0.032*** 0.038*** 0.039*** 0.038*** 0.038***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Estimated impact of Klein-Shambaugh classification over the distribution of NFCD
KS+KS x NFCD -0.014* -0.019* -0.021* -0.021* -0.021*
(5th percentile of NFCD) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
KS+KS x NFCD -0.010** -0.016* -0.018** -0.017** -0.017**
(25th percentile of NFCD) (0.005) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
KS+KS x NFCD -0.008* -0.015* -0.016* -0.015* -0.016*
(45th percentile of NFCD) (0.004) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
KS+KS x NFCD -0.007 -0.014 -0.015* -0.014 -0.015
(65th percentile of NFCD) (0.004) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
KS+KS x NFCD -0.005 -0.012 -0.014 -0.013 -0.013
(85th percentile of NFCD) (0.006) (0.011) (0.01) (0.01) (0.011)
Angrist-Pischke F-stat 97.6, 40.5 100.7, 49.1 28.2, 13.2 28.2, 13.2
OverID test (p-value) 0.37 0.38
N=201 in models (1)-(5). KS=Klein-Shambaugh regime classification (1=non-peg, 0=peg) for 1-year
recovery period. NFCD=Initial net foreign currency debt. See Section 3.1.3 for definitions of external
debt measure. Definitions of control variables are provided in Section 3.2.3. ***, **, and * denote
statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively. Standard errors clustered by
country shown in parentheses. The excluded instruments for models (2) and (3) are regime record and
regime record x NFCD. The excluded instruments for models (4) and (5) are regime record x World Bank
income group interactions and regime record x NFCD x World Bank income group interactions. The null
in the overidentifying restrictions test (OverID) is that the instruments are exogenous. Angrist-Pischke
F-test null hypothesis is that instruments are weak. Angrist-Pischke F-statistics (a, b) are for (a) KS first
stage; and (b) KS*NFCD first stage. Rule-of thumb critical value in F-test is 10. 2SLS denotes two-stage
least squares estimator and LIML denotes the limited information maximum likelihood estimator.
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always statistically significant at the 10 percent level with p-values for the exchange rate
regime regime coefficient often far below this threshold. Therefore, the results in Table
3.4 support the view that the exogenous component of variation in the exchange rate
regime is significantly associated with growth during the first year of the recovery when
NFCD is sufficiently low.
Turning to diagnostics, the number of instruments used in column (4) is greater than
the number of endogenous variables and as a result, the overidentifying restrictions
test can be applied to that model. The results of this test fail to indicate that the
instruments are not exogenous. In addition, the Angrist and Pischke multivariate F-test
for excluded instruments is greater than the rule-of-thumb critical value of ten in all IV
specifications in Table 4 (specifications (2)-(5)). Thus, the F-test does not suggest a
weak instrument problem in the IV models. Angrist and Pischke (2009) contend that
limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) estimation of overidentified models is
‘approximately median-unbiased’ [p.209] even in the presence of weak instruments and
consequently, application of LIML to the IV specification with six instruments provides
a further means of investigating the validity of the estimation in column (4). The
LIML estimates in column (5) are very similar to those in column (4) and thus, there is
additional evidence regarding the robustness of the overidentified two-stage least squares
estimates.
Table 3.5 contains the estimates using the net debt (ND) measure, which captures net
external debt (denominated in domestic or foreign currency) as a proportion of (HP-
smoothed) GDP. These results follow a similar general relationship to that observed
with NFCD but the growth difference between regimes tends to be slightly smaller. The
similarity of the results across the two debt measures appears reasonable since the me-
dian proportion of overall debt liabilities accounted for by foreign currency denominated
debt liabilities is approximately 99.9 percent while the average of the same ratio is 93.7
percent. The corresponding median and mean values for debt assets are 100 percent and
94.7 percent respectively. Consequently, the difference between NFCD and ND will tend
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to be relatively small. Moreover, variation in the foreign currency denominated debt
will typically be the major driver of changes in overall debt. That said, even though the
difference between the two debt metrics tends to be relatively small, the fact that there
is a disparity implies that the ND will be less accurate than NFCD in capturing the
currency mismatch that theory suggests is important for comparing the performance
of exchange rate regimes. In turn, this minor inaccuracy could explain the tendency
toward slightly lower point estimates for the exchange rate regime when using the ND
measure.
Throughout the estimations in Table 3.5, the control variables were of the expected sign
and in some instances statistically significant. The first stage diagnostics (F-statistic
and overidentifying restrictions test) and the LIML estimation in column (5) once again
support the validity of the IV estimations when using the ND measure.
3.3.3 External Debt: Multiyear Horizons
Table 3.6 contain the estimates for the 1-, 2- and 3-year horizons when using the NFCD
and ND measures. When the horizon is extended to the 2-year post-recession time
period, a pegged regime is still associated with faster recovery growth than a non-
pegged regime at relatively low levels of NFCD. As Table 3.6 shows, over the 2-year
horizon this relationship is statistically significant at the 10 percent level when NFCD
is between the 25th and 45th percentile levels. The growth difference between regimes
is also economically significant with a pegged regime being associated with an increase
in the 2-year recovery growth rate of 2.7 percentage points compared to a non-pegged
regime when NFCD is at the 45th percentile. Interestingly, the corresponding growth
difference for the 3-year recovery growth rate is also 2.7 percentage points. A similar
lack of growth between the 2nd and 3rd post-recession years is also evident at other
external debt levels. Thus, it is apparent that the change in the growth difference
between regimes when moving from the 1-year to the 2-year horizons is noticeably larger
than the corresponding change in the growth difference when moving from the 2-year to
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Table 3.5: Exchange Rate Flexibility, Net Debt and Recovery Growth
Dependent variable = 1-year (log) growth of real GDP per capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS LIML
KS -0.005 -0.014 -0.015 -0.014 -0.014
(0.006) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
KS x ND 0.009 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.006
(0.014) (0.018) (0.019) (0.017) (0.018)
ND -0.005 0.0001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002
(0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
Estimated impact of Klein-Shambaugh classification over the distribution of ND
KS+KS x ND -0.012 -0.016 -0.018 -0.018* -0.019*
(5th percentile of ND) (0.008) (0.01) (0.011) (0.01) (0.01)
KS+KS x ND -0.009** -0.015* -0.017** -0.016** -0.017**
(25th percentile of ND) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
KS+KS x ND -0.008* -0.015* -0.016* -0.015* -0.016*
(45th percentile of ND) (0.004) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
KS+KS x ND -0.007 -0.015 -0.016* -0.015* -0.016
(65th percentile of ND) (0.005) (0.01) (0.009) (0.009) (0.01)
KS+KS x ND -0.006 -0.014 -0.015 -0.014 -0.015
(85th percentile of ND) (0.006) (0.011) (0.01) (0.01) (0.011)
Angrist-Pischke F-stat 91.4, 38.6 94.3, 45.9 24.6, 12.5 24.6, 12.5
OverID test (p-value) 0.198 0.208
N=201 in models (1)-(5). KS=Klein-Shambaugh regime classification (1=non-peg, 0=peg) for 1-year
recovery period. ND=Initial net debt. See Section 3.1.3 for definitions of external debt measures. The
baseline set of controls is used throughout but the coefficients are not reported. Model (3) also includes
the currency crisis dummy but the coefficient is not reported. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance
at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively. Standard errors clustered by country shown in parentheses.
The excluded instruments for models (2) and (3) are regime record and regime record x ND. The excluded
instruments for models (4) and (5) are regime record x World Bank income group interactions and regime
record x ND x World Bank income group interactions. The null in the overidentifying restrictions
test (OverID) is that the instruments are exogenous. Angrist-Pischke F-test null hypothesis is that
instruments are weak. Angrist-Pischke F-statistics (a, b) are for (a) KS first stage; and (b) KS*ND first
stage. Rule-of thumb critical value in F-test is 10. 2SLS denotes the two-stage least squares estimator
and LIML denotes the limited information maximum likelihood estimator.
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the 3-year horizon. Consequently, it appears as though most of the benefits of pegging
for countries with relatively low levels of NFCD occur within the first 2-years following
the trough of the recession.
The results in Table 3.6 also suggest that the growth difference between regimes over the
2-year timeframe does not vary substantially with changes in the level of ND. Viewed in
light of the multiyear estimates under NFCD, this outcome emphasises the importance
of the foreign currency denominated component of debt in the determination of balance
sheet effects during a recovery.
The first stage diagnostics (F-statistic and overidentifying restrictions test) also support
the validity of the multiyear IV estimations. In addition, when the 2- and 3-year speci-
fications were estimated using six instruments (results not reported to save space), the
overidentifying restrictions test failed to indicate that the instruments were not exoge-
nous. At the same time, LIML estimations of the overidentified multiyear specifications
yielded point estimates that were similar to the overidentified two-stage least squares
estimations.
3.3.4 Sensitivity Analysis
Throughout the estimations under NFCD and ND, the control variables were typically
of the expected sign and in some instances were statistically significant. In the 1-year
results, the point estimates for trade openness were always significant at the 10 percent
level or better, while capital account openness was always significant at the 1 percent
level. In the multiyear estimations, the change in the terms of trade index was con-
sistently significant at the 5 percent level. These features of the results support the
validity of the model specification and in turn, strengthen the reliability of the estima-
tions for the main variables of interest. Nevertheless, further tests of robustness will still
be applied.
The robustness of the estimations with NFCD was assessed using two alternative mea-
sures of the international balance sheet. These alternatives are two versions of the debt
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Table 3.6: Exchange Rate Flexibility and Multiyear Recovery Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1-year 2-year 3-year 1-year 2-year 3-year
KS -0.012 -0.022 -0.025 -0.014 -0.027 -0.030
(0.011) (0.018) (0.019) (0.012) (0.018) (0.023)
KS x NFCD 0.009 0.015 0.007
(0.018) (0.037) (0.046)
NFCD -0.007 0.009 0.017
(0.012) (0.030) (0.038)
KS x ND 0.002 -0.002 -0.004
(0.018) (0.036) (0.046)
ND 0.0001 0.023 0.034
(0.013) (0.028) (0.033)
Estimated impact of Klein-Shambaugh classification over the distribution of NFCD or ND
KS+KS x NFCD or ND -0.019* -0.034 -0.031 -0.016 -0.026 -0.027
(5th percentile of NFCD or ND) (0.011) (0.026) (0.031) (0.01) (0.025) (0.031)
KS+KS x NFCD or ND -0.016* -0.029* -0.028 -0.015* -0.027 -0.029
(25th percentile of NFCD or ND) (0.009) (0.017) (0.019) (0.008) (0.017) (0.021)
KS+KS x NFCD or ND -0.015* -0.027* -0.027* -0.015* -0.027* -0.029
(45th percentile of NFCD or ND) (0.009) (0.015) (0.015) (0.009) (0.015) (0.019)
KS+KS x NFCD or ND -0.014 -0.025* -0.026* -0.015 -0.027* -0.030
(65th percentile of NFCD or ND) (0.009) (0.015) (0.015) (0.01) (0.015) (0.020)
KS+KS x NFCD or ND -0.012 -0.023 -0.025 -0.014 -0.027 -0.030
(85th percentile of NFCD or ND) (0.011) (0.017) (0.018) (0.011) (0.017) (0.021)
N 201 194 190 201 194 190
Angrsit-Pischke F-stat 97.6, 40.5 81.8, 27.0 106.2, 33.2 91.4, 38.6 75.1, 27.0 100.3, 34.3
Dependent variable: growth in real GDP per capita over timeframe specified in column heading. KS=Klein-Shambaugh regime classification
(1=non-peg, 0=peg) for 1-year recovery period. KS=average of one-year Klein-Shambaugh classifications for multiyear estimates. NFCD=Initial
net foreign currency debt, and ND=Initial net debt. See Section 3.1.3 for definitions of external debt measures. The baseline set of controls is used
throughout but the coefficients are not reported. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively. Standard
errors clustered by country shown in parentheses. The excluded instruments are regime record and regime record x NFCD or ND. Angrist-Pischke
F-test null hypothesis is that instruments are weak. Angrist-Pischke F-statistics (a, b) are for (a) KS first stage; and (b) KS*NFCD or KS*ND
first stage. Rule-of thumb critical value in F-test is 10. 2SLS estimator used throughout models (1)-(6).
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liability dollarization measure, one calculated using the foreign currency factors prepared
by Lane and Shambaugh (2010), the other using the OSIN index of Eichengreen et al
(2003). These estimations are presented in Table 3.7. The 1- and 2-year results using
either version of debt liability dollarization are broadly consistent with the estimations
under NFCD. At the 1- and 2-year horizons a pegged regime is linked with faster re-
covery growth than a non-peg when debt liability dollarization moves above a threshold
level (i.e. when foreign currency denominated debt liabilities are a sufficiently large
proportion of gross debt). The degree of statistical precision in the IV estimates was
slightly higher than under NFCD with the growth difference between regimes at the 1-
and 2-year horizons consistently attaining significance at the 5 percent level when using
debt liability dollarization. The growth difference between regimes at sufficiently high
levels of debt liability dollarization was also economically significant over the 1- and
2-year timeframes. In sum, the robustness of the results is evident from the stability
of the general nature of the relationship of interest at the 1- and 2-year horizons when
switching to these alternative external debt metrics.10
When expanding the set of control variables the relationship between exchange rate
regime and growth in the first recovery year is not materially affected. The results for
three amendments to the set of conditioning variables are displayed in Table 3.8. The
controls include variables which are expected to influence regime choice (which itself is
correlated with regime record) and/or recovery growth. Consequently, these supplemen-
tary regressions provide further evidence favouring the validity of the estimations.
In addition, the estimations in Table 3.9 show that after removing the country-year
observations involving a switch in the exchange rate regime during the recovery, the
10Both two-stage least squares and LIML estimation of the overidentified models under debt liability
dollarization yielded results that were similar to the just-identified estimates in Table 3.7 (results not
reported to save space). Although one of the first stage F-statistics for the overidentified model was
less than the rule-of-thumb critical value of 10, the similarity between the overidentified two-stage least
squares and LIML estimates suggests that the relatively weaker instrument set in that specification did
not generate bias in the point estimates (since LIML is approximately median unbiased even with weak
instruments), and consequently, further evidence is provided for the robustness of our main finding.
The overidentifying restrictions test was not applied to the overidentified model under debt liability
dollarization as the possibility of there being weak instruments in that specification implied that the
results of the test could be unreliable.
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Table 3.7: Robustness: Alternative Measures of Foreign Currency Debt
Dependent variable = 1-year (log) growth of real GDP per capita
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1-year 2-year 1-year 2-year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
KS -0.029** -0.067*** -0.029* -0.066**
(0.013) (0.025) (0.015) (0.029)








Estimated impact of Klein-Shambaugh classification over the distribution of DLD1 or DLD2
KS+KS x DLD1 or DLD2 0.0002 0.013 0.005 0.018
(5th percentile of DLD1 or DLD2) (0.008) (0.013) (0.008) (0.020)
KS+KS x DLD1 or DLD2 -0.016* -0.032** -0.014* -0.028**
(25th percentile of DLD1 or DLD2) (0.009) (0.016) (0.009) (0.014)
KS+KS x DLD1 or DLD2 -0.022** -0.047** -0.021* -0.044**
(45th percentile of DLD1 or DLD2) (0.010) (0.020) (0.011) (0.020)
KS+KS x DLD1 or DLD2 -0.024** -0.054** -0.024* -0.052**
(65th percentile of DLD1 or DLD2) (0.011) (0.022) (0.012) (0.023)
KS+KS x DLD1 or DLD2 -0.027** -0.060*** -0.026* -0.058**
(85th percentile of DLD1 or DLD2) (0.012) (0.023) (0.014) (0.026)
N 201 194 201 194
Angrist-Pischke F-statistic 24.0, 213.7 24.6, 242.4 20.0, 260.7 20.4, 109.2
KS=Klein-Shambaugh regime classification (1=non-peg, 0=peg) for recovery period specified in column
heading. DLD1=Initial debt liability dollarization calculated using Lane-Shambaugh foreign currency
factors. DLD2=Initial debt liability dollarization calculated using OSIN index. See Section 3.1.3 for
definitions of external debt measures. The baseline set of controls is used throughout but the coeffi-
cients are not reported. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels
respectively. Standard errors clustered by country shown in parentheses. The excluded instruments for
models (1) and (2) are regime record and regime record x DLD1. The excluded instruments for models
(3) and (4) are regime record and regime record x DLD2. Angrist-Pischke F-test null hypothesis is that
instruments are weak. Angrist-Pischke F-statistics (a, b) are for (a) KS first stage; and (b) KS*DLD
first stage. Rule-of thumb critical value in F-test is 10. 2SLS estimator used throughout models (1)-(4).
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Table 3.8: Robustness: Changes to the Set of Conditioning Variables
Dependent variable = 1-year (log) growth of real GDP per capita
(1) (2) (3)
KS -0.013 -0.014 -0.008
(0.012) (0.012) (0.008)
KS x NFCD 0.009 0.006 0.018
(0.018) (0.018) (0.012)


















Estimated impact of Klein-Shambaugh classification over the distribution of NFCD
KS+KS x NFCD -0.020* -0.019 -0.023**
(5th percentile of NFCD) (0.011) (0.012) (0.009)
KS+KS x NFCD -0.017* -0.017* -0.016**
(25th percentile of NFCD) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007)
KS+KS x NFCD -0.015* -0.016* -0.013*
(45th percentile of NFCD) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007)
KS+KS x NFCD -0.014 -0.015 -0.011
(65th percentile of NFCD) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008)
KS+KS x NFCD -0.013 -0.014 -0.008
(85th percentile of NFCD) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008)
N 201 191 132
Angrist-Pischke F-statistic 94.1, 40.2 86.7, 39.6 37.2, 40.7
N=201 in models (1)-(3). KS=Klein-Shambaugh regime classification (1=non-peg, 0=peg) for 1-year
recovery period. NFCD=Initial net foreign currency debt. See Section 3.1.3 for definition of external debt
measure. Coefficients for control variables not reported. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at
the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively. Standard errors clustered by country shown in parentheses.
The excluded instruments for models (1)-(3) are regime record and regime record x NFCD. Angrist-
Pischke F-test null hypothesis is that instruments are weak. Angrist-Pischke F-statistics (a, b) are for
(a) KS first stage; and (b) KS*NFCD first stage. Rule-of thumb critical value in F-test is 10. 2SLS
estimator used throughout models (1)-(3).
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growth difference between pegged and non-pegged systems remains statistically signifi-
cant when NFCD is relatively low or when debt liability dollarization is sufficiently high.
Although the absolute magnitude of the growth difference between regimes is smaller
than with the full sample, it is still economically significant. Thus, the general nature of
the relationship between exchange rate regime and recovery growth that was apparent
in the full sample is also evident when the observations involving a switch in regime are
removed.11
Despite this similarity, the changes in the point estimates on removing the switchers are
somewhat revealing. Taken together the disparities between the point estimates for the
full and reduced size sample give a hint that switching regimes during the recovery year
had a more substantial effect on the recovery than leaving the regime unchanged. More-
over, the reduced sample results also allude to the balance sheet effects being larger
under a switch since greater exchange rate flexibility is associated with significantly
slower recovery growth at lower levels of foreign currency denominated external indebt-
edness when the switchers are included. That is, the results indicate that the adverse
balance sheet effects stemming from increased exchange rate flexibility begin to signifi-
cantly exceed the expenditure switching effects at higher levels of NFCD (or lower levels
of debt liability dollarization) when the switchers are included. At the same time, the
average annual increase (i.e. depreciation) in the exchange rate during the recovery
year was 13 percent for the countries switching to a new non-peg and 6.5 percent for
the countries whose non-peg was in place immediately before the recovery. Thus, the
disparity between the post-recession experiences of the switchers and non-switchers re-
lies on the magnitude of the balance sheet effects being more sensitive to exchange rate
movements than the expenditure switching effects. Grounds for the differential sensitivi-
ties are not readily apparent. The relatively large exchange rate movements experienced
by the regime switchers would have led to larger changes in net worth, and as a result,
the likelihood of default by public and private entities would have been higher for those
11The expanded model specifications used in Table 3.8 were also applied to the sample with regime
switchers omitted and the main inferences were unchanged
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countries. In turn, the balance sheet effects would appear more severe for the switchers
since the valuation effect is correlated with the likelihood or occurrence of default. How-
ever, none of the three sovereign debt crises in the sample occurred in the same year as
a switch from a pegged to non-pegged regime, and consequently, the balance sheet ef-
fects stemming from the greater exchange rate movements experienced by the switchers
did not lead to sovereign debt crises during the year of the switch. Alternatively, the
larger balance sheet effects under a regime switch may have increased the probability
of a debt crisis, and thus, although a debt crisis did not actually occur, the increased
probability of one happening may have led to lower recovery growth under a non-pegged
arrangement when a switch of exchange rate system took place. Testing this possibility
appears infeasible within the econometric framework adopted here, and is thus left to
future work.12
The estimations in Table 3.9 indicate that when describing the general relationship sug-
gested by this study in quantitative terms, the debt threshold and growth difference
based on the sample without the switchers should be used. Consequently, the growth
difference between regimes achieves statistical significance (at the 10 percent level) when
NFCD is at or below the 39th percentile (net foreign currency denominated debt equals
-34 percent of GDP), and when debt liability dollarization is at or above the 28th per-
centile level (foreign currency denominated debt equals 62 percent of gross debt). At
the same time, the growth difference between regimes when net foreign currency debt is
at the 39th percentile is 1.1 percentage points, and when debt liability dollarization is
at the 28th percentile the growth difference is also 1.1 percentage points.
The results of the sensitivity analysis described here strengthen the general inference
that recovery growth under an exchange rate peg is superior to that under a non-
pegged regime when external foreign currency denominated debt liabilities are relatively
large.
12A paper by Razin and Rubinstein (2006), which considers how the probability of a currency crisis
influences the relationship between a country’s choice of exchange rate regime and economic growth,
could be helpful in guiding future that seeks to understand how debt crisis probability affects recovery
growth when a switch in exchange rate regimes takes place.
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Table 3.9: Robustness: Removing the Regime Switchers
Dependent variable = 1-year (log) growth of real GDP per capita
(1) (2) (3) (4)
KS -0.012 -0.007 -0.029** -0.021**
(0.011) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010)








Switchers included? Yes No Yes No
Estimated impact of Klein-Shambaugh classification over the distribution of NFCD or DLD
KS+KS x NFCD or DLD1 -0.019* -0.017* 0.0002 0.002
(5th percentile of NFCD or DLD1) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007)
KS+KS x NFCD or DLD1 -0.016* -0.013* -0.016* -0.011
(25th percentile of NFCD or
DLD1)
(0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007)
KS+KS x NFCD or DLD1 -0.015* -0.011 -0.022** -0.015*
(45th percentile of NFCD or
DLD1)
(0.009) (0.007) (0.010) (0.008)
KS+KS x NFCD or DLD1 -0.014 -0.009 -0.024** -0.017**
(65th percentile of NFCD or
DLD1)
(0.009) (0.008) (0.011) (0.009)
KS+KS x NFCD or DLD1 -0.012 -0.007 -0.027** -0.019**
(85th percentile of NFCD or
DLD1)
(0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009)
N 201 160 201 160
Angrist-Pischke F-statistic 97.6, 40.5 113.5, 112.8 24.0, 213.7 98.0, 799.3
KS=Klein-Shambaugh regime classification (1=non-peg, 0=peg) for 1-year recovery period.
NFCD=Initial net foreign currency debt. DLD1=Initial debt liability dollarization calculated using
Lane-Shambaugh foreign currency factors. See Section 3.1.3 for definitions of external debt measures.
The baseline set of controls is used throughout but the coefficients are not reported. ***, **, and *
denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively. Standard errors clustered by
country shown in parentheses. The excluded instruments for models (1) and (2) are regime record and
regime record x NFCD. The excluded instruments for models (3) and (4) are regime record and regime
record x DLD1. Angrist-Pischke F-test null hypothesis is that instruments are weak. Angrist-Pischke
F-statistics (a, b) are for (a) KS first stage; and (b) KS*NFCD or DLD1 first stage. Rule-of thumb
critical value in F-test is 10. 2SLS estimator used throughout models (1)-(4).
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3.3.5 Discussion
In sum, these results suggest the existence of an economically and statistically significant
relationship between an exogenous component of exchange rate regime variation and
recovery growth when external foreign currency denominated debt passes a threshold
level. Beyond this threshold pegs appear to grow faster than non-pegs in the first two
years of a recovery. What’s more, the magnitude of this growth difference between
regimes increases as NFCD decreases (or as debt liability dollarization increases). Such
an outcome can be explained on the grounds that when external indebtedness passes
the threshold level, the adverse balance sheet effects resulting from increased exchange
rate flexibility begin to significantly exceed the beneficial expenditure switching effects.
Consequently, pegs begin to outperform non-pegs at these relatively higher levels of
indebtedness. As the debt measure moves further beyond the threshold, the balance
sheet effects become larger and the growth difference between regimes expands.
This outcome can be rationalised using the model presented by Cook (2004), which
suggests the adverse balance sheet effects stemming from an exchange rate depreciation
exceed the beneficial expenditure switching effects when foreign currency debt is suffi-
ciently large. As a result, a peg is more effective at absorbing a shock to world interest
rates than a flexible regime under such configurations of the international balance sheet.
This theoretical prediction is reasonably consistent with our results which indicate that
increased exchange rate flexibility is associated with significantly slower recovery growth
when net foreign currency debt exceeds a threshold level.
The general nature of the relationship is also consistent with the empirical work of
Broda (2004) and Towbin and Weber (2011), which suggested that flexible exchange
rate arrangements are less proficient shock absorbers when foreign currency denominated
debt is relatively high. The remainder of the existing empirical literature suggested that
increased exchange rate flexibility universally boosts recoveries and consequently, the
results obtained here represent a challenge to these findings. The difference in results
may simply reflect the choice in much of this earlier work to use an empirical strategy
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that did not consider the impact of increased exchange rate flexibility at specific foreign
currency debt levels. Alternatively, the disparity could also be a symptom of differences
in the model specification, time period being analysed and the exchange rate regime
classification methodology being used. Similar conflicts are evident in the literature
on the link between long-run growth and the choice of exchange rate regime, where
changes in model specification, approach to regime coding and time period being studied
often lead to diametrically opposing inferences regarding the impact of exchange rate
flexibility.
Further investigation of this contradiction did not yield a clear explanation for the dis-
parity between the results obtained here and those from earlier work. When the baseline
specification for this study is re-estimated without the interaction term and with both
the interaction term and foreign currency debt level removed, the results suggest an in-
verse and statistically significant relationship between the Klein-Shambaugh measure of
exchange rate flexibility and 1-year recovery growth. Thus, the inclusion of the debt mea-
sure cannot explain the contradictory findings. Using the Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger
(2005) exchange rate regime classification system in these narrowed specifications yields
a positive but statistically and economically insignificant coefficient on the regime vari-
able. Thus, while the use of an alternative regime coding scheme leads to different
inferences being made, the outcome still does not bear clear similarities to the existing
literature. That said, there is a mild hint that regime classification methodology may
be responsible for part of the disparity between the results in this study and earlier
work.
Finally, the absence of a significant positive association between increased exchange rate
flexibility and recovery growth at positive or relatively low levels of net foreign currency
debt in this study is somewhat puzzling. It could be the case that the expenditure
switching effect is not statistically significant. If this were the case, it would contradict a
large portion of the existing empirical work on the link between exchange rate flexibility
and economic recoveries.
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3.3.6 Total Assets and Total Liabilities
Table 3.10 shows the estimates for the 1-year horizon using the net foreign currency
assets and total liability dollarization measures of the international balance sheet.13
The observations involving a switch in exchange rate regime during the recovery year
have been excluded. The estimates suggest that the growth difference between pegged
and non-pegged regimes does not exhibit a statistically significant link with either total
liability dollarization or net foreign currency assets at the 1-year horizon. The growth
difference between regimes may not depend on these broader balance sheet metrics due
to the fact that substantial proportions of total liabilities and total assets are comprised
of financial derivative, FX reserves, equity and FDI positions. On average these other
components of the international balance sheet comprise 47 percent of total assets and
27 percent of total liabilities for the sample studied here. The role that balance sheet
components other than debt play in the relationship between exchange rate flexibility
and growth may be different to the role played by debt and, as a result, the weakened
results observed under net foreign currency assets may be a symptom of this divergence.
That is, if the FDI and equity positions led to balance sheet effects of the same nature
as debt then the results for net foreign currency assets would be more similar to the
estimations with debt.
The control variables for the models displayed in Table 3.10 were of the expected sign and
sometimes statistically significant. Moreover, the diagnostic testing and estimation of a
multi-instrument version of the model supported the validity of the IV estimations.
13The 2- and 3-year results under net foreign currency assets are not used as it appears as though
they may be highly sensitive to the addition of a very small number of observations. A small number
of observations are omitted from all the 2- and 3-year estimations since the 2- and 3-year averaged
exchange rate regime variables are not available for them. These observations are included in the normal
1-year sample as they do possess the 1-year regime. If the 1-year estimations with net foreign currency
assets are re-run with these observations omitted then the main relationship of interest is statistically
significant whereas the inclusion of the observations yields an association that is statistically insignificant.
Consequently, there would be very good reason to doubt the validity of any inferences based on the 2-
and 3-year net foreign currency assets estimations using the reduced sized sample and for that reason
they are not included in this paper. Our estimations using the debt portion of the balance sheet do not
exhibit such material changes when the reduced multiyear sample size is used.
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Table 3.10: Exchange Rate Flexibility, Total Balance Sheet and 1-year Recovery Growth












Estimated impact of Klein-Shambaugh classification over the distribution of NFCA or TLD
KS+KS x NFCA or TLD -0.013 -0.008
(5th percentile of NFCA or TLD) (0.012) (0.008)
KS+KS x NFCA or TLD -0.011 -0.010
(25th percentile of NFCA or TLD) (0.008) (0.007)
KS+KS x NFCA or TLD -0.011 -0.012
(45th percentile of NFCA or TLD) (0.007) (0.007)
KS+KS x NFCA or TLD -0.010 -0.012
(65th percentile of NFCA or TLD) (0.007) (0.008)
KS+KS x NFCA or TLD -0.009 -0.013
(85th percentile of NFCA or TLD) (0.008) (0.010)
N 160 160
Angrist-Pischke F-stat 167.2, 13.9 65.1, 243.6
N=160 in models (1)-(2). Observations involving a change in the exchange rate regime during the
recovery year are excluded. KS=Klein-Shambaugh regime classification (1=non-peg, 0=peg) for 1-year
recovery period. NFCA=Initial net foreign currency assets. TLD=Initial total liability dollarization
calculated using Lane-Shambaugh foreign currency factors. See Section 3.1.3 for definitions of balance
sheet measures. The baseline set of controls is used throughout but the coefficients are not reported. ***,
**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively. Standard errors
clustered by country shown in parentheses. The excluded instruments for model (1) is regime record and
regime record x NFCA. The excluded instruments for model (2) is regime record and regime record x
TLD. Angrist-Pischke F-test null hypothesis is that instruments are weak. Angrist-Pischke F-statistics
(a, b) are for (a) KS first stage; and (b) KS*NFCA or KS*TLD first stage. Rule-of thumb critical value
in F-test is 10. 2SLS estimator used throughout models (1)-(2).
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The presence of a significant relationship when focusing on foreign currency denominated
debt combined with the absence of a significant association under the broader balance
sheet measures suggests that foreign currency debt exposure is the most relevant balance
sheet metric when considering the impact of a given exchange rate regime on growth
during a recovery.
3.4 Conclusion
This study examined the relationship between exchange rate flexibility and growth dur-
ing economic recoveries. Much attention was given to the role of foreign currency denom-
inated borrowing in this relationship due to the emphasis placed on balance sheet effects
in the theoretical literature. Both OLS and two-stage least squares estimation techniques
were employed in this endeavour. The IV estimation took advantage of variation in the
exchange rate regime emanating from differences in the history of pre-recovery exchange
rate regime choices. The use of this exogenous variation addressed the potential reverse
causality and measurement error problems originating with the gauge of exchange rate
flexibility.
The results highlight a circumstance in which exogenous variation in the exchange rate
regime matters for the speed of economic recoveries. Specifically, recovery growth with
an exchange rate peg appeared to be significantly higher than under a non-pegged regime
when foreign currency denominated debt is relatively large. Moreover, this growth dis-
parity was both economically and statistically significant. The general relationship was
apparent with both estimators but the link between the main variables of interest was
stronger in both economic and statistical terms when using two-stage least squares. The
validity of the IV estimations is supported by the results of thorough diagnostic testing,
while the robustness of main relationship of interest was confirmed by subjecting the
estimations to changes in the set of conditioning variables and the use of alternative
measures of foreign currency denominated debt. In addition, the general relationship
was weakened though not to a point of statistical or economic insignificance upon remov-
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ing the observations involving a change in exchange rate regime during the first recovery
year. Taken together, these results challenge much of the existing empirical work on the
subject at hand.
The results of this study can be justified on the grounds that when foreign currency
borrowing is sufficiently high, the balance sheet effects resulting from exchange rate
movements begin to significantly outweigh expenditure switching effects and in turn,
a peg will be associated with a faster recovery than a non-pegged arrangement. Al-
though the theoretical literature offers this rationalisation of the main finding of this
study, the field would benefit if future empirical work involved a more detailed investi-
gation of the adjustment mechanism through which the balance sheet and expenditure
switching effects stemming from exchange rate movements ultimately impact economic
recoveries.
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3.6 Appendix A: List of 55 Countries
High Income Upper Middle Income Lower Middle Income
Australia Algeria Bolivia
Austria Argentina Egypt
Belgium Brazil El Salvador
Canada Chile Guatemala
Czech Republic Colombia India





Hungary South Africa Pakistan
Iceland Uruguay Papua New Guinea















Income levels based on World Bank grouping scheme.
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change in the real interest rate over the final year of the
precding recession. Real interest rate equals lending interest
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Index measuring presence of multiple exchange rates,
restrictions on current and capital account transactions, and the




Annual percentage change in the CPI. For countries with no





(log) change in global world merchandise exports (in current US





(log) Change in the terms of trade over the recovery. Terms of
trade measured using Exports as a capacity to import: the
current price value of exports of goods and services deflated by
the import price index
World Bank
WDI
IMF IFS data was obtained from the Economic and Social Data Service (ESDS).
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3.8 Appendix C: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Median St dev Max Min
(log) change in government expenditure/GDP 0.012 0.019 0.084 0.362 -0.322
Capital account openness 0.443 0.404 0.343 1 0
Trade openness 66.291 55.007 45.217 369.416 7.180
1-year (log) change in the terms of trade 0.071 0.070 0.111 0.602 -0.372
2-year (log) change in the terms of trade 0.140 0.137 0.146 0.713 -0.424
3-year (log) change in the terms of trade 0.194 0.193 0.190 0.850 -0.507
1-year (log) change in global world exports 0.096 0.091 0.090 0.379 -0.075
2-year (log) change in global world exports 0.201 0.203 0.162 0.708 0.101
3-year (log) change in global world exports 0.285 0.287 0.192 0.877 -0.117
Currency crisis dummy 0.010 0.000 0.100 1 0
Banking crisis during recession 0.124 0.000 0.331 1 0
Change in political regime index 0.550 0 3.064 14.000 -15.000
Change in real interest rate -0.063 10.254 -0.191 52.200 -41.678
Recession amplitude 0.049 0.024 0.062 0.360 0.0002
N=201 for all variables other than real interest rate where N=132.
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